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ABSTRACT	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  we	  compare	  the	  abilities	  of	  Big	  Five	  locus	  of	  personality	  traits,	  
religiosity,	  risk	  aversion,	  contextual,	  and	  historical	  variables	  in	  explaining	  behavior	  
in	  the	  Trust	  Game,	  the	  Minimum	  Effort	  Game,	  and	  a	  Cheap	  Talk	  Game.	  We	  find	  that	  
that	  behavior	  in	  the	  games	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  contextual	  and	  historical	  
variables,	  with	  some	  influence	  from	  personality	  traits.	  This	  suggests	  that,	  while	  
there	  is	  a	  role	  for	  personality	  traits	  in	  explaining	  behavior	  in	  economic	  settings,	  
most	  variation	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  context	  of	  economic	  interactions	  and	  the	  results	  
of	  previous	  interactions.	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CHAPTER	  ONE	  
INTRODUCTION	  
	   The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  roles	  played	  by	  personality	  trait	  
theory	  and	  commonly	  used	  economic	  parameters	  toward	  the	  goal	  of	  explaining	  
behavior	  in	  various	  economic	  settings.	  Specifically,	  we	  seek	  to	  explore	  the	  interplay	  
of	  economic	  parameters	  and	  the	  Big	  Five	  model	  of	  personality.	  To	  explore	  this,	  we	  
must	  first	  provide	  some	  background	  on	  both	  game	  theory	  and	  personality	  
psychology.	  	  
	   The	  field	  of	  personality	  psychology	  seeks	  to	  construct	  sensible	  models	  for	  
explaining	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  we	  are.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  designed	  to	  
present	  a	  comprehensive	  picture	  for	  explaining	  behavior.	  Theories	  of	  personality	  
can	  themselves	  be	  divided	  into	  trait	  theories,	  type	  theories,	  psychoanalytic	  theories,	  
behaviorist	  theories,	  social	  cognitive	  theories,	  humanistic	  theories,	  and	  
biopsychological	  theories.	  These	  theories	  have	  been	  developed	  from	  different	  
perspectives	  regarding	  the	  primary	  drivers	  of	  human	  behavior	  (Larson	  and	  Buss	  
2008).	  	  
We	  focus	  on	  trait	  theories,	  which	  are,	  according	  to	  the	  Diagnostic	  and	  
Statistical	  Manual	  (DSM)	  of	  the	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association	  (APA),	  “enduring	  
patterns	  of	  perceiving,	  relating	  to,	  and	  thinking	  about	  the	  environment	  and	  oneself	  
that	  are	  exhibited	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  social	  and	  personal	  contexts”	  (DSM-­‐IV-­‐TR	  
2000)	  A	  properly	  defined	  trait	  is,	  then,	  one	  that	  is	  relatively	  stable	  over	  time,	  is	  part	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of	  a	  comprehensive	  framework,	  varies	  along	  a	  continuum,	  and	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  
consistently	  predict	  behavior	  in	  a	  large	  variety	  of	  settings.	  	  
There	  are,	  as	  would	  be	  expected,	  several	  varieties	  of	  trait	  theories.	  Some	  
theories	  have	  as	  few	  as	  two	  traits,	  while	  others	  have	  as	  many	  as	  twenty	  one	  
(Mathews	  et	  al	  2009).	  We	  focus	  on	  the	  theory	  developed	  by	  Lewis	  Goldberg,	  among	  
others,	  known	  colloquially	  as	  “The	  Big	  Five”	  or	  “The	  Five	  Factor	  Model.”	  This	  model	  
posits	  that	  there	  are	  5	  major	  dimensions	  to	  personality:	  openness	  to	  experience,	  
conscientiousness,	  extraversion,	  agreeableness,	  and	  neuroticism	  (OCEAN)	  
(Goldberg	  1990).	  We	  focus	  on	  this	  model	  largely	  because	  it	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  
dominant	  and	  widely	  known	  model	  from	  the	  personality	  psychology	  literature,	  and	  
it	  is	  also	  the	  most	  general	  (Goldberg	  1990).	  	  
Economic	  games	  can	  take	  many	  forms.	  Most	  broadly,	  games	  fall	  into	  4	  types	  
stemming	  from	  two	  categories.	  Games	  are	  either	  static	  or	  dynamic,	  and	  either	  of	  
complete	  or	  incomplete	  information	  (Gibbons	  1992).	  A	  static	  game	  is	  one	  in	  which	  
all	  moves	  are	  made	  simultaneously,	  while	  dynamic	  games	  require	  turn	  based	  
decision-­‐making.	  A	  game	  of	  complete	  information	  is	  one	  in	  which	  all	  pertinent	  
information	  is	  made	  available	  to	  all	  participating	  parties,	  while	  incomplete	  
information	  games	  necessitate	  that	  some	  players	  have	  more	  information	  than	  
others	  (Gibbons	  1992).	  	  
We	  prefer	  to	  divide	  games	  based	  on	  the	  real-­‐world	  phenomena	  that	  we	  wish	  
to	  explore.	  There	  exist	  a	  plethora	  of	  potentially	  interesting	  real-­‐world	  situations	  we	  
can	  explore	  with	  economic	  games.	  Choosing	  games	  of	  interest	  then	  largely	  becomes	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a	  matter	  of	  those	  that	  generate	  phenomena	  we	  wish	  to	  explore,	  those	  that	  
potentially	  have	  a	  role	  for	  the	  Big	  Five	  model	  of	  personality	  traits,	  and	  those	  that	  can	  
be	  executed	  given	  the	  constraints	  of	  time.	  	  
As	  mentioned,	  we	  seek	  to	  explore	  the	  interplay	  of	  economic	  parameters	  and	  
the	  Big	  Five	  model	  of	  personality.	  The	  roles	  the	  two	  play	  can	  be	  that	  of	  substitutes,	  
complements,	  or	  neither	  (Borghans	  et	  al	  2008).	  That	  is,	  either	  one	  approach	  will	  be	  
predictive	  while	  the	  other	  will	  not,	  the	  two	  approaches	  will	  bolster	  one	  another’s	  
predictive	  power,	  or	  there	  will	  be	  no	  predictive	  power	  in	  either	  approach.	  Since	  the	  
economist’s	  approach	  has	  been	  fitted	  to	  explain	  behavior	  in	  their	  context,	  we	  should	  
see	  predictive	  power	  from	  the	  parameters	  commonly	  used	  to	  explain	  behavior	  in	  
their	  context.	  However,	  it	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  while	  the	  economist’s	  approach	  
works	  in	  individualized	  contexts,	  the	  personality	  psychology	  approach	  could	  be	  a	  
more	  comprehensive	  model	  that	  can	  explain	  behavior	  in	  many	  or	  all	  games.	  	  
To	  explore	  this	  relationship,	  we	  deploy	  three	  games,	  a	  personality	  
questionnaire,	  and	  a	  decision	  problem	  designed	  to	  elicit	  risk	  preferences.	  The	  three	  
games	  provide	  the	  setting	  we	  explore,	  while	  the	  decision	  problem	  and	  the	  
personality	  questionnaire	  are	  used	  to	  generate	  a	  risk	  aversion	  parameter	  and	  the	  
score	  on	  the	  Big	  Five	  locus	  of	  personality	  traits,	  respectively.	  Specifically,	  the	  three	  
games	  we	  select	  are	  the	  trust	  game,	  the	  minimum	  effort	  game,	  and	  a	  cheap	  talk	  
game.	  	  
The	  trust	  game	  provides	  us	  a	  dynamic	  game	  of	  complete	  information,	  which	  
explores	  the	  phenomena	  of	  altruism,	  reciprocity,	  trust,	  and	  risk	  aversion	  (Berg	  et	  al	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1994).	  The	  minimum	  effort	  game	  is	  a	  dynamic	  game	  of	  complete	  information,	  which	  
provides	  an	  environment	  to	  explore	  the	  phenomena	  of	  cooperation,	  coordination,	  
and	  risk	  aversion	  (Van	  Huyck	  et	  al	  1990).	  The	  cheap	  talk	  game	  is	  a	  dynamic	  game	  of	  
incomplete	  information,	  which	  allows	  us	  to	  explore	  the	  phenomena	  of	  truth	  telling	  
and	  trust	  (Dickhaut	  et	  al	  1995).	  These	  games	  are	  played	  at	  varying	  lengths,	  once	  or	  
repeatedly,	  which	  provides	  insight	  into	  the	  influence	  of	  history	  and	  reputation	  
building,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  influence	  of	  knowledge	  that	  there	  will	  be	  no	  history,	  
reputation	  building,	  or	  recourse.	  We	  also	  explore	  the	  role	  played	  by	  religiosity	  since	  
all	  of	  the	  games	  incorporate	  some	  element	  of	  honesty,	  dishonesty,	  and	  trust,	  all	  of	  
which	  may	  be	  impacted	  by	  religiosity.	  Finally,	  we	  also	  gather	  demographic	  
information	  since	  previous	  literature	  in	  both	  game	  theory	  and	  personality	  
psychology	  has	  shown	  than	  certain	  groups	  behave	  in	  systematically	  different	  ways	  
in	  various	  contexts.	  	  
This	  thesis	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  Chapter	  2	  we	  present	  an	  overview	  
of	  previously	  existing	  literature	  germane	  to	  our	  games	  of	  interest	  and	  personality	  
research.	  We	  then	  describe	  the	  specific	  tools	  and	  measures	  used	  to	  explore	  our	  
research	  questions	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  Chapter	  4	  explains	  the	  method	  used	  in	  the	  present	  
study.	  We	  then	  present	  the	  results	  of	  our	  analysis	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  followed	  by	  Chapter	  
6,	  a	  discussion	  section	  in	  which	  we	  make	  more	  speculative	  remarks	  as	  to	  what	  our	  
results	  suggest	  and	  outline	  a	  path	  for	  future	  research.	  Finally,	  an	  appendix	  contains	  
the	  instructions	  used	  to	  guide	  participants	  in	  lab	  sessions,	  for	  reference.	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CHAPTER	  TWO	  
REVIEW	  OF	  LITERATURE	  
	   We	  divide	  the	  literature	  review	  into	  several	  sections.	  These	  sections	  describe	  
the	  literature	  relevant	  for	  each	  game	  played	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  providing	  a	  justification	  
for	  our	  experiment	  design.	  Finally,	  we	  review	  literature	  that	  has	  combined	  insights	  
from	  game	  theory	  and	  personality	  psychology.	  	  
Review	  of	  relevant	  trust	  game	  literature	  
Berg,	  Dickhaut,	  and	  McCabe	  (1995)	  is	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  Trust/Investment	  
game.	  	  They	  set	  up	  two	  treatments,	  one	  with	  no	  history	  and	  one	  with.	  In	  the	  no	  
history	  treatment,	  all	  matching	  is	  random	  and	  anonymous.	  In	  the	  treatment	  with	  
history	  they	  use	  the	  results	  from	  the	  first	  treatment	  as	  a	  baseline	  for	  behavior	  
norms.	  A	  $10	  show	  up	  fee	  is	  given	  to	  people	  in	  one	  room	  who	  decide	  how	  much	  to	  
send	  to	  counterparts	  in	  another	  room.	  Each	  dollar	  sent	  is	  tripled.	  Subjects	  in	  the	  
second	  room	  decide	  how	  much	  of	  invested	  amount	  to	  send	  back.	  The	  unique	  Nash	  
equilibrium	  prediction	  for	  this	  game	  with	  perfect	  information	  is	  for	  the	  first-­‐mover	  
to	  send	  nothing,	  and	  sub-­‐game	  perfection	  shows	  that	  anything	  received	  by	  the	  
second	  mover	  will	  be	  kept	  (stage	  two	  is	  a	  dictator	  game).	  A	  second,	  social	  history,	  
treatment	  is	  also	  used	  in	  which	  subjects	  were	  given	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  no	  history	  
results	  as	  part	  of	  their	  instructions.	  
From	  a	  rational	  choice	  perspective,	  subjects	  who	  sent	  money	  must	  have	  
believed	  their	  expected	  return	  was	  positive.	  Trusting	  behavior	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  
an	  equilibrium	  of	  a	  repeated	  game	  through	  reputation	  building.	  Trust	  can	  also	  be	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seen	  as	  an	  evolutionary	  stable	  strategy	  that	  emerges	  in	  evolutionary	  models,	  as	  
studied	  by	  Guth	  and	  Kliment	  (1993),	  Guth	  et	  al	  (1993)	  and	  Cosmides	  and	  Tooby	  
(1992).	  If	  the	  second-­‐mover	  interprets	  first-­‐mover’s	  behavior	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  use	  
trust	  to	  improve	  the	  outcome	  for	  both	  parties	  then	  he	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  reciprocate.	  	  
In	  the	  no	  history	  treatment,	  first-­‐movers	  sent	  an	  average	  of	  $5.16	  and	  
second-­‐movers	  returns	  an	  average	  of	  $4.66.	  5/32	  sent	  entire	  amount,	  2/32	  sent	  
nothing,	  with	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  variation	  in-­‐between.	  Among	  second-­‐movers,	  12/28	  
returned	  nothing,	  while	  11/28	  returned	  more	  than	  their	  partners	  sent	  giving	  the	  
first-­‐mover	  a	  positive	  net	  return.	  There	  was	  no	  correlation	  between	  amount	  sent	  
and	  payback	  decisions.	  We	  employ	  a	  modified	  form	  of	  this	  game	  for	  our	  experiment.	  	  
Ben-­‐Ner	  and	  Halldorsson	  (2009)	  seek	  to	  clarify	  what	  is	  trusting	  and	  
trustworthiness.	  They	  define	  trusting	  as	  the	  inclination	  of	  one	  person	  to	  believe	  
another	  person	  will	  cooperate	  for	  his	  benefit	  and	  will	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  him	  if	  
the	  opportunity	  arises.	  Specifically,	  trusting	  is	  defined	  with	  three	  qualities:	  (1)	  B	  will	  
not	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  situation	  to	  make	  a	  gain	  while	  imposing	  a	  loss	  on	  A,	  (2)	  B	  
will	  not	  act	  maliciously	  towards	  A,	  (3)	  B	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  make	  small	  sacrifices	  for	  
A,	  and	  (4)	  B	  is	  competent	  to	  act	  favorably	  towards	  A.	  In	  the	  trust	  game,	  trusting	  is	  
measured	  as	  the	  amount	  A	  sends.	  Trustworthiness,	  then,	  is	  the	  willingness	  of	  a	  
person	  B	  to	  act	  favorably	  towards	  A,	  when	  A	  has	  an	  expectation	  of	  reciprocity	  from	  
B,	  and	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  amount	  B	  returns.	  
Ben-­‐Ner	  and	  Halldorsson	  focus	  on	  a	  set	  of	  qualities	  that	  may	  be	  correlated	  
with	  trusting	  and	  trustworthiness.	  These	  qualities	  are	  optimism/pessimism,	  faith	  in	  
	   7	  
God,	  altruistic	  and	  reciprocal	  tendencies,	  beliefs	  about	  the	  honesty	  of	  others,	  
attitudes	  towards	  fairness,	  and	  risk	  attitudes.	  	  
Their	  results	  are	  as	  follows.	  The	  average	  amount	  sent	  in	  the	  trust	  game	  was	  
$5.47	  out	  of	  $10.	  They	  find	  evidence	  of	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  demographics	  
and	  the	  four	  measures	  of	  interest.	  More	  agreeable,	  more	  extroverted,	  less	  
conscientious,	  and	  less	  neurotic	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  trusting.	  Females	  exhibit	  greater	  
amounts	  of	  trusting	  in	  surveys.	  Optimism	  is	  correlated	  with	  survey	  measures	  but	  
not	  with	  amount	  sent.	  Altruism	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  amount	  sent	  but	  
insignificantly	  with	  survey	  measures.	  Risk-­‐aversion	  survey	  and	  lottery	  measures	  
show	  no	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  with	  any	  measures.	  Faith	  in	  God	  has	  a	  
small	  relationship	  with	  some	  survey	  measures,	  but	  not	  amount	  sent.	  They	  find	  little	  
relationship	  between	  risk	  attitudes	  and	  the	  various	  measures	  of	  trusting	  they	  use.	  
We	  further	  explore	  several	  of	  these	  relationships	  in	  our	  experiment.	  
They	  further	  find	  a	  moderate	  relationship	  between	  demographics	  and	  all	  
four	  measures,	  particularly	  between	  the	  proportion	  returned	  and	  a	  Machiavellian	  
scale,	  a	  scale	  that	  measures	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  subject	  remains	  cool	  and	  detached	  
towards	  the	  end	  of	  deceiving	  and	  manipulating	  others.	  They	  find	  negative	  
relationships	  between	  the	  Machiavellian	  scale	  and	  agreeableness,	  extroversion,	  
openness	  to	  experience	  and	  conscientiousness.	  	  
Only	  40	  cents	  of	  each	  dollar	  sent	  are	  explained	  by	  the	  amount	  sent	  in	  the	  
dictator	  game	  so	  the	  rest	  is	  attributed	  to	  an	  investment	  motive	  among	  people	  who	  
want	  to	  maximize	  profits	  and	  are	  willing	  to	  trust	  to	  do	  so.	  Since	  risk	  aversion	  seems	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to	  be	  determined	  by	  factors	  that	  are	  different	  than	  those	  that	  determine	  amount	  
sent,	  it	  suggests	  that	  these	  measure	  different	  things.	  They	  cannot	  explain	  
trustworthiness	  with	  reciprocity	  or	  altruism	  since	  it	  is	  not	  related	  to	  the	  amount	  
sent	  or	  to	  the	  reciprocity	  variable.	  They	  use	  this	  to	  infer	  that	  proportion	  returned	  
reflects	  a	  sense	  of	  obligation	  to	  reward	  the	  trustor’s	  investment,	  i.e.,	  
trustworthiness.	  The	  positive	  effect	  of	  agreeableness	  further	  suggests	  this	  
relationship.	  Those	  who	  rank	  low	  on	  agreeableness,	  openness	  to	  experience,	  
extraversion,	  and	  conscientiousness,	  but	  high	  on	  cognitive	  ability	  have	  a	  greater	  
tendency	  to	  “cheat”.	  However,	  such	  Machiavellian	  effects	  disappear	  after	  controlling	  
for	  birth/childhood	  factors.	  Thus,	  proportion	  sent	  back	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  good	  measure	  
of	  trustworthiness	  and	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  no	  good	  survey	  measures	  found	  to	  
capture	  trustworthiness.	  	  
They	  conclude	  that	  the	  trust	  game	  is	  indeed	  a	  good	  measure	  of	  trusting	  and	  
trustworthiness.	  Most	  of	  the	  variation	  of	  behavior	  in	  the	  game	  is	  explained	  by	  
gender	  with	  weaker	  influence	  from	  personality	  traits.	  The	  facets	  captured	  by	  
surveys	  appear	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  personality	  traits.	  The	  best	  predictor	  of	  
trustworthiness	  appears	  to	  be	  agreeableness.	  We	  aim	  to	  replicate	  several	  of	  these	  
findings	  in	  our	  experiment.	  
Evans	  and	  Revelle	  (2008)	  seek	  to	  challenge	  the	  finding	  of	  economists	  that	  
trust	  is	  largely	  situational.	  They	  use	  a	  self-­‐constructed	  Propensity	  to	  Trust	  Survey	  
(PTS)	  to	  elicit	  a	  disposition	  known	  as	  propensity	  to	  trust	  and	  assess	  its	  validity	  
using	  the	  Trust	  game	  with	  a	  multiplier,	  the	  number	  that	  the	  amount	  sent	  is	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multiplied	  by	  before	  reaching	  the	  receiver,	  of	  three.	  They	  study	  trusting	  and	  
trustworthiness	  as	  constructs	  that	  complement	  the	  Big	  Five	  model	  of	  personality	  
traits.	  The	  trait	  of	  trust	  is	  often	  treated	  as	  a	  sub-­‐scale	  of	  agreeableness	  (Digman	  
1990;	  Goldberg	  1990).	  They	  use	  two	  studies:	  (1)	  the	  PTS	  is	  used	  to	  predict	  the	  Big	  
Five	  and	  (2)	  the	  PTS	  is	  used	  as	  a	  predictor	  of	  trusting	  behavior	  in	  the	  Trust	  Game.	  	  
Trusting	  was	  positively	  associated	  with	  agreeableness	  and	  extraversion	  and	  
negatively	  with	  neuroticism.	  Trustworthiness	  was	  positively	  related	  to	  
agreeableness,	  conscientiousness,	  and	  openness	  to	  experience.	  Trusting	  and	  
trustworthiness	  were	  themselves	  very	  weakly	  correlated.	  Multiple	  regressions	  on	  
trusting	  found	  that	  it	  was	  positively	  related	  to	  extraversion	  and	  negatively	  related	  to	  
neuroticism.	  Multiple	  regressions	  on	  trustworthiness	  showed	  it	  was	  predicted	  by	  
agreeableness	  and	  conscientiousness.	  	  
In	  a	  second	  study,	  subjects	  were	  assigned	  to	  sender	  only,	  receiver	  only,	  or	  
simultaneous	  conditions.	  They	  found	  that	  amount	  sent	  increased	  with	  
agreeableness	  and	  trusting,	  however,	  agreeableness	  was	  no	  longer	  significant	  in	  a	  
model	  that	  included	  trusting	  and	  adding	  trusting	  increased	  the	  predictive	  power	  of	  
the	  model	  by	  51%.	  Trusting	  and	  amount	  returned	  were	  positively	  correlated	  and	  
significant	  at	  a	  0.05	  level	  in	  the	  receiver	  only	  condition.	  In	  the	  simultaneous	  
condition,	  PTS	  and	  Big	  Five	  were	  both	  unrelated	  to	  amount	  returned.	  	  
They	  use	  their	  results	  to	  make	  the	  following	  conclusions.	  The	  PTS	  measure	  
for	  trusting	  predicts	  sending	  money	  in	  the	  Trust	  Game	  and	  that	  this	  measure	  is	  a	  
better	  predictor	  than	  the	  Big	  Five.	  The	  disposition	  of	  trusting,	  rather	  than	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trustworthiness,	  predicted	  returning	  money.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  high	  trustors	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  interpret	  the	  game	  as	  a	  reciprocal	  exchange.	  They	  also	  find	  from	  the	  
condition	  comparison	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  invest	  when	  they	  were	  
in	  a	  symmetric	  situation.	  Further,	  playing	  both	  roles	  discouraged	  investment.	  The	  
amount	  sent	  in	  the	  first	  rounds	  was	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  amount	  returned	  
in	  the	  second	  round.	  Perceptions	  of	  fairness	  also	  seem	  to	  matter	  in	  that	  those	  who	  
previously	  invested	  $5	  or	  more	  were	  unlikely	  to	  return	  any	  money	  in	  the	  second	  
round,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  They	  were	  also	  unlikely	  to	  return	  money	  to	  a	  partner	  who	  
had	  shown	  less	  trust	  than	  they	  had,	  which	  suggests	  perception	  of	  fairness	  matter	  
more	  than	  underlying	  dispositions.	  We	  further	  explore	  these	  relationships	  in	  our	  
study.	  
Johnson	  and	  Mislin	  (2011)	  analyzed	  162	  replications	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  the	  Berg,	  
Dickhaut,	  and	  McCabe	  Trust	  game	  to	  identify	  the	  effect	  of	  experimental	  protocols	  
and	  geography.	  They	  use	  the	  following	  variables	  to	  predict	  amount	  sent	  and	  
received:	  (1)	  Amount	  at	  stake,	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  endowment	  of	  the	  sender;	  (2)	  
Receiver	  endowment;	  (3)	  Rate	  of	  return,	  which	  is	  the	  multiplier	  applied	  to	  the	  
amount	  sent,	  and	  a	  multiplier	  of	  2	  or	  3;	  (4)	  Whether	  or	  not	  participants	  played	  the	  
role	  of	  both	  sender	  and	  receiver,	  or	  just	  one;	  (5)	  Random	  payments,	  where	  a	  
random	  payment	  is	  a	  condition	  where	  the	  subject	  payment	  is	  not	  systematically	  
related	  to	  decisions	  made	  in	  the	  game;	  (7)	  Strategy	  method,	  which	  is	  where	  
participants	  are	  initially	  asked	  to	  state	  how	  they	  would	  respond	  to	  each	  possible	  
decision	  made	  by	  their	  partner,	  or	  otherwise;	  (8)	  Whether	  or	  not	  participants	  are	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anonymous;	  (9)	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  study	  is	  double-­‐blinded;	  (10)	  Whether	  or	  not	  
subjects	  were	  students.	  Finally,	  geographical	  information	  is	  also	  analyzed	  to	  see	  if	  
systematic	  differences	  exist	  when	  the	  game	  is	  played	  in	  different	  regions.	  
They	  find	  that	  whether	  payment	  is	  random	  exhibits	  a	  robustly	  significant	  and	  
negative	  effect	  on	  amount	  sent.	  Playing	  against	  a	  real	  person	  has	  a	  significant	  
positive	  impact	  on	  amount	  sent.	  Double-­‐blindness	  does	  not	  exhibit	  any	  effect.	  The	  
effects	  of	  receiver	  endowment	  and	  anonymity	  have	  mixed	  effects.	  Concerning	  
geography,	  they	  find	  that	  subjects	  in	  Africa	  send	  less	  than	  North	  Americans.	  There	  is	  
a	  consistent	  tendency	  to	  return	  more	  when	  more	  is	  sent.	  Student	  populations	  
return,	  on	  average,	  0.8	  standard	  deviations	  less	  than	  adult	  subjects.	  Players	  
engaging	  in	  both	  roles	  in	  different	  rounds	  has	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  trustworthiness.	  
Stakes	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  influence	  behavior	  in	  the	  game	  in	  that	  sender	  endowment	  
size	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  trusting	  or	  trustworthiness.	  When	  the	  amount	  sent	  is	  doubled	  
rather	  than	  tripled,	  the	  proportion	  returned	  declines	  less	  than	  proportionately,	  that	  
is,	  reciprocity	  decreases	  as	  the	  multiplier	  increases.	  This	  suggests	  an	  explanation	  
that	  when	  the	  rate	  or	  return	  is	  high,	  receivers	  interpret	  sender	  decisions	  as	  
investments,	  rather	  than	  altruism	  or	  inequity	  concerns.	  We	  use	  this	  meta-­‐analysis	  to	  
construct	  some	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  in	  our	  experiment.	  
Burks,	  Carpenter,	  and	  Verhoogen	  (2002)	  focus	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  playing	  both	  
roles	  against	  the	  control	  of	  playing	  just	  one	  in	  the	  trust	  game.	  In	  one	  treatment,	  
subjects	  find	  out	  they	  will	  play	  the	  receiver	  role	  only	  after	  having	  played	  the	  sender	  
role.	  In	  the	  second	  treatment,	  they	  know	  in	  advance	  that	  they	  will	  play	  both	  roles.	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Their	  primary	  result	  is	  that	  having	  subjects	  play	  both	  roles	  reduces	  both	  the	  amount	  
sent	  as	  well	  as	  the	  amount	  sent	  back,	  i.e.,	  trusting	  and	  trustworthiness.	  This	  effect	  
exhibits	  itself	  only	  when	  subjects	  are	  informed	  that	  they	  will	  be	  playing	  both	  roles.	  
They	  further	  explore	  how	  variation	  in	  behavior	  is	  explained	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  survey	  
questions.	  	  
They	  find	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  control	  treatment	  
of	  playing	  just	  one	  role	  and	  the	  no	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  playing	  both	  roles	  treatment.	  
Comparing	  the	  no	  prior	  knowledge	  treatment	  with	  the	  prior	  knowledge	  treatment	  
reveals	  a	  result	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  people	  trusting	  less	  
when	  they	  know	  they	  will	  play	  both	  roles.	  When	  people	  are	  aware	  they	  will	  play	  
both	  roles,	  they	  return	  very	  little	  if	  anything,	  that	  is,	  trusting	  does	  not	  pay.	  	  
Review	  of	  relevant	  minimum	  effort	  game	  literature	  
Van	  Huyck,	  Battalio,	  and	  Beil	  (1990)	  were	  the	  first	  to	  create	  the	  minimum	  
effort	  game	  set	  up.	  Players	  play	  a	  symmetric	  game	  where	  
.	  The	  parameter,	  a,	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  technological	  
efficiency,	  b	  can	  represent	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  putting	  effort	  into	  joint	  
production,	  technology	  is	  Leontief	  and	  a	  >	  b	  >	  0.	  The	  game	  has	  symmetric	  Nash-­‐
equilibria	  in	  pure	  strategies	  when	  all	  e’s	  are	  equal	  and	  equilibria	  can	  be	  Pareto	  
ranked.	  Explicit	  coordination	  is	  not	  permitted.	  Since	  payoffs	  are	  increasing	  in	  the	  
minimum	  effort,	  all	  players	  prefer	  the	  highest	  minimum,	  but	  there	  is	  incentive	  to	  
choose	  lower	  effort	  levels	  if	  other	  players	  make	  mistakes.	  There	  is	  riskiness	  in	  
increasing	  the	  group	  size	  in	  that	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  minimum	  effort	  is	  1	  goes	  to	  
π (ei,e−i ) = a[min(ei,e−i )]− b(ei )
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1	  as	  group	  size	  goes	  to	  infinity,	  cetaris	  paribus,	  because	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  making	  
a	  mistake	  greater	  than	  zero,	  at	  least	  one	  participant	  will	  make	  a	  mistake.	  A	  more	  
risk	  averse	  person	  will	  select	  lower	  efforts.	  	  
	   In	  some	  treatments,	  participants	  were	  allowed	  to	  make	  predictions	  and	  they	  
found	  that	  predictions	  about	  expected	  behavior	  matched	  actual	  behavior,	  that	  is,	  
those	  that	  made	  optimistic	  prediction	  chose	  higher	  effort	  levels	  than	  those	  who	  
made	  pessimistic	  predictions.	  	  
	   The	  evolution	  of	  behavior	  also	  raises	  interesting	  issues	  as	  initially	  players	  
can	  use	  only	  intuition	  to	  predict	  behavior.	  However,	  as	  players	  play	  repeatedly,	  their	  
effort	  choices	  can	  be	  guided	  by	  results	  from	  previous	  rounds.	  They	  find	  that	  
repeating	  the	  game	  leads	  to	  convergence	  to	  a	  stable	  outcome.	  Though	  the	  level	  of	  
convergence	  varies	  from	  group	  to	  group,	  the	  general	  trend	  is	  downward;	  by	  round	  
10,	  72%	  of	  subjects	  adopt	  the	  secure	  action	  of	  choosing	  the	  minimum	  possible	  
effort.	  	  
	   In	  the	  third	  treatment,	  group	  size	  is	  reduced	  to	  2.	  As	  expected,	  since	  there	  is	  
now	  less	  risk	  in	  choosing	  a	  higher	  effort,	  coordination	  at	  higher	  levels	  is	  found.	  42%	  
of	  groups	  chose	  the	  maximum	  effort	  level	  and	  74%	  of	  subjects	  chose	  a	  higher	  effort	  
level	  than	  they	  did	  in	  the	  larger	  group,	  averaging	  over	  rounds.	  We	  use	  this	  
experiment	  to	  guide	  our	  selection	  of	  payoff	  function	  parameters,	  group	  size,	  and	  the	  
number	  of	  rounds.	  
	   Knez	  and	  Camerer	  (1994)	  chose	  a	  setup	  where	  several	  rounds	  of	  the	  game	  
were	  played	  by	  3	  person	  groups	  for	  5	  rounds.	  The	  minimum	  was	  made	  known.	  Each	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subject	  guessed	  what	  they	  thought	  the	  minimum	  would	  be	  in	  each	  round	  and	  were	  
rewarded	  if	  they	  guessed	  correctly.	  In	  next	  5	  rounds,	  group	  i	  and	  j	  were	  combined	  
into	  6	  person	  groups.	  	  
They	  find	  that	  aggregating	  from	  3	  to	  6	  person	  groups	  lowers	  the	  minimum	  
action	  and	  lowers	  efficiency.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  general	  tendency	  to	  the	  lowest	  possible	  
minimum	  as	  was	  seen	  in	  Van	  Huyck	  et	  al.	  (1990).	  By	  the	  final	  period	  26/30	  subjects	  
chose	  the	  minimum,	  while	  the	  other	  four	  chose	  and	  effort	  of	  2.	  They	  find	  moving	  
from	  2	  to	  3	  person	  group	  has	  the	  biggest	  harm	  on	  efficiency.	  We	  select	  the	  number	  
of	  rounds	  played	  as	  well	  as	  group	  size	  based	  on	  these	  findings	  
The	  number	  of	  repetitions	  is	  an	  important	  determinant	  for	  equilibrium	  
selection.	  Berninghaus	  and	  Ehrhart	  (1998)	  hypothesize	  that	  when	  players	  know	  
there	  are	  many	  repetitions,	  they	  are	  more	  patient	  and	  tolerant	  in	  seeking	  
coordination	  on	  the	  Pareto	  best	  equilibrium.	  They	  set	  a	  payoff	  function	  of	  
	  and	   	  so	  there	  are	  9	  symmetric	  Nash	  
equilibria.	  They	  find	  when	  the	  number	  of	  repetitions	  is	  equal	  to	  10,	  Pareto	  worst	  
choices	  were	  selected,	  when	  it	  is	  90,	  Pareto	  best	  choices	  were	  made,	  when	  it	  is	  30,	  
either	  outcome	  may	  occur.	  They	  hypothesize	  players	  exhibit	  a	  degree	  of	  tolerance	  
when	  there	  are	  a	  large	  number	  of	  repetitions	  remaining.	  We	  use	  these	  results	  to	  
guide	  number	  of	  round	  selection,	  as	  well	  as	  highlighting	  potential	  predictors	  to	  
explore.	  
Goeree	  and	  Holt	  (1999)	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  effort	  in	  the	  
minimum	  effort	  game.	  They	  focus	  on	  single	  period	  minimum	  effort	  games	  with	  
π i (ei ) =10+ 2*min[e1,...,e8 ]− ei e∈ [1,..., 9]
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groups	  of	  randomly	  matched	  subjects	  who	  make	  effort	  selections.	  The	  payoff	  is	  
	  where	   	  c	  represents	  effort	  cost.	  As	  long	  as	  c	  
is	  less	  than	  1,	  payoffs	  are	  maximized	  when	  all	  players	  choose	  the	  highest	  possible	  
effort	  and	  there	  is	  a	  Nash	  equilibrium	  at	  any	  common	  effort	  level,	  so	  non	  critical	  
changes	  will	  not	  alter	  the	  Nash	  equilibria	  with	  pure	  strategies.	  The	  low	  effort	  
equilibrium	  is	  risk-­‐dominant	  when	  the	  cost	  of	  effort	  is	  sufficiently	  high.	  
In	  a	  two	  person	  experiment,	  subjects	  are	  allowed	  to	  choose	  effort	  levels	  
continuously	  between	  [110,	  170].	  The	  cost	  parameter	  was	  set	  at	  ¼	  for	  one	  
treatment	  and	  ¾	  for	  another.	  This	  change	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  theoretical	  predictions	  
of	  theories	  based	  on	  best-­‐responses	  to	  others’	  decisions.	  	  Subjects	  played	  10	  periods	  
with	  random	  pairings.	  After	  each	  period,	  players	  were	  informed	  of	  their	  own	  
earnings	  and	  the	  other	  person’s	  decision.	  Three	  sessions	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  high	  
cost	  treatment	  (c=3/4)	  and	  three	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  low	  cost	  treatment	  (c=1/4).	  
They	  find	  the	  averages	  of	  all	  sessions	  begin	  near	  the	  midpoint	  of	  the	  range.	  In	  
the	  low	  cost	  sessions,	  effort	  levels	  started	  around	  the	  midpoint	  and	  then	  steadily	  
trended	  upwards.	  In	  the	  high	  cost	  sessions,	  effort	  choices	  began	  in	  the	  middle	  and	  
trended	  down	  toward	  lower	  effort	  choices.	  	  They	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  
treatment	  effect	  at	  a	  5%	  level	  of	  significance.	  Another	  two	  sessions	  were	  run	  that	  
lasted	  20	  rounds	  with	  similar	  results.	  
They	  then	  move	  from	  two	  to	  three	  player	  groups,	  with	  low	  cost	  sessions	  
having	  a	  c=0.1	  and	  a	  high	  cost	  session	  equal	  to	  c=0.5	  so	  that	  n*c	  is	  greater	  than	  1	  in	  
the	  high	  cost	  treatment	  and	  less	  than	  1	  in	  the	  low	  cost	  treatment.	  They	  find	  that	  in	  
π i = (e1,...,en ) =min(e1,...,en )− cei i =1,...,n.
	   16	  
the	  low-­‐cost	  session,	  decisions	  begin	  slightly	  above	  the	  midpoint	  of	  effort	  choices	  
and	  then	  trend	  upwards	  and	  reach	  and	  stay	  at	  the	  maximum	  effort.	  In	  the	  high	  cost	  
session,	  effort	  choices	  begin	  slightly	  above	  the	  midpoint,	  but	  steadily	  trend	  
downward.	  We	  use	  this	  paper	  to	  generate	  an	  appropriate	  cost	  parameter	  in	  our	  
minimum	  effort	  game.	  	  
Review	  of	  relevant	  “Cheap	  Talk”	  literature	  
	   Dickhaut,	  McCabe,	  and	  Mukherji	  (1995)	  set	  up	  a	  game	  in	  which	  a	  Sender	  is	  
given	  private	  information	  about	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  and	  sends	  a	  message	  to	  a	  
receiver	  who	  selects	  an	  action	  that	  determines	  the	  outcome	  for	  both	  parties.	  The	  
outcomes	  are	  arranged	  in	  a	  way	  such	  that	  the	  sender	  and	  receiver’s	  preferences	  
over	  states	  and	  actions	  diverge.	  A	  similarity	  parameter	  is	  used	  to	  measure	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  preferences	  diverge.	  A	  high	  similarity	  parameter	  implies	  
preferences	  are	  not	  aligned	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  
	   They	  arrange	  4	  different	  states,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  equally	  likely	  to	  occur,	  as	  
well	  as	  4	  different	  possible	  action	  selections.	  The	  messages	  available	  to	  the	  sender	  
range	  from	  complete	  truth	  telling	  about	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  and	  then	  increasing	  
levels	  of	  misrepresentations	  regarding	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  though	  messages	  can	  be	  
sent	  in	  tandem	  such	  that	  a	  message	  of	  {1,	  2}	  is	  a	  message	  stating	  either	  state	  1	  or	  
state	  2	  is	  equally	  likely.	  	  
	   They	  find	  the	  following	  results.	  They	  find	  when	  preferences	  are	  less	  aligned,	  
the	  ability	  of	  the	  receiver	  to	  infer	  the	  state	  from	  the	  message	  is	  progressively	  
impaired.	  Consistent	  with	  this,	  they	  find	  receivers’	  payoffs	  decrease	  as	  preferences	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diverge,	  which	  means	  coordination	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  achieved.	  We	  will	  control	  for	  	  
the	  impact	  of	  incentives	  on	  truth	  telling	  behavior	  by	  senders,	  as	  incentive	  to	  lie	  
results	  in	  lowered	  coordination.	  
	   Crawford	  (1997)	  surveys	  cheap	  talk	  games,	  games	  in	  which	  players’	  
messages	  are	  communicated	  regarding	  payoffs,	  but	  do	  not	  directly	  impact	  payoffs.	  
He	  analyzes	  a	  variety	  of	  experimental	  designs.	  He	  claims	  an	  ideal	  design	  is	  one	  in	  
which	  the	  environment	  is	  controlled,	  a	  population	  is	  paired	  repeatedly,	  randomly,	  
anonymously,	  subjects	  are	  told	  the	  outcome	  after	  each	  round	  to	  observe	  the	  effect	  of	  
learning,	  clear	  instructions,	  and	  subjects	  are	  paid	  according	  to	  their	  earnings	  in	  the	  
game.	  This	  helps	  us	  establish	  a	  baseline	  for	  our	  experiment	  setup.	  	  
	   Gneezy	  (2005)	  constructs	  a	  2-­‐person	  interaction	  game	  in	  which	  lying	  
increases	  payoffs	  to	  the	  liar	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  his	  partner	  to	  see	  how	  changes	  in	  
relative	  payoffs	  impact	  the	  sender’s	  decision	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  lie.	  Gneezy’s	  
setup	  is	  the	  setup	  that	  most	  closely	  resembles	  our	  own	  design.	  His	  game	  has	  two	  
possible	  states	  and	  two	  possible	  messages.	  The	  states	  regard	  two	  possible	  payoffs	  
while	  the	  messages	  proclaim	  either	  one	  option	  contains	  a	  better	  result	  for	  the	  
receiver	  or	  the	  converse.	  When	  incentives	  are	  aligned,	  the	  equilibrium	  is	  truth	  
telling.	  When	  incentives	  do	  not	  align,	  there	  are	  only	  mixed	  strategy	  equilibria.	  
	   Absolute	  and	  relative	  consequences	  of	  lies	  are	  varied	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  is	  
measured	  on	  the	  propensity	  to	  lie.	  He	  further	  uses	  a	  questionnaire	  to	  elicit	  subjects’	  
opinions	  regarding	  lying.	  Sender’s	  beliefs	  regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  message	  are	  of	  
interest.	  To	  elicit	  this,	  senders	  are	  asked	  to	  guess	  how	  the	  receiver	  would	  react	  to	  
	   18	  
their	  message.	  Thus,	  if	  sender’s	  believe	  their	  message	  will	  be	  heeded,	  and	  incentives	  
are	  not	  aligned,	  then	  they	  will	  send	  the	  message	  that	  maximizes	  his	  payoffs.	  
	   Gneezy	  finds	  that,	  in	  the	  treatment	  where	  gains	  and	  losses	  from	  lying	  were	  
symmetrical,	  but	  small,	  36%	  of	  senders	  lied.	  In	  the	  second	  treatment,	  where	  the	  
losses	  to	  the	  receiver	  from	  believing	  a	  lie	  greatly	  exceeded	  the	  sender’s	  gain	  from	  
having	  a	  lie	  believed	  decreased	  to	  rate	  of	  lying	  to	  17%.	  In	  the	  third	  treatment,	  where	  
the	  gains	  and	  losses	  to	  senders	  and	  receivers	  respectively	  were	  symmetrical	  but	  
high,	  the	  rate	  of	  lying	  increased	  to	  52%.	  All	  of	  these	  findings	  were	  significant	  at	  the	  
5%	  level.	  He	  concludes,	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  an	  additional	  dictator	  game	  used	  as	  a	  control,	  
that	  behavior	  is	  motivated	  both	  by	  altruism	  and	  an	  aversion	  to	  lying.	  Further,	  from	  
the	  questionnaire,	  Gneezy	  determines	  that	  people	  believe	  it	  is	  worse	  to	  lie	  as	  the	  
cost	  of	  choosing	  incorrectly	  increases	  for	  the	  other	  side.	  
Pagés	  and	  Vorsatz	  (2007)	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  there	  exist	  two	  conflicting	  forces	  
in	  behavior	  in	  sender-­‐receiver	  cheap	  talk	  games.	  Specifically,	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  
between	  incentives	  and	  normative	  social	  behavior	  with	  incentives	  pushing	  one	  to	  lie	  
and	  normative	  social	  behavior	  applying	  pressure	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  	  
They	  set	  up	  two	  similar	  games	  which	  they	  call	  a	  benchmark	  game	  and	  a	  
punishment	  game.	  In	  the	  benchmark	  game,	  the	  payoffs	  are	  structured	  such	  that	  
senders	  and	  receivers	  have	  opposing	  preferences.	  The	  sender	  has	  incentive	  to	  lie	  
and	  the	  receiver	  must	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  trust	  the	  message.	  Complete	  
rationality	  implies	  that	  the	  only	  equilibrium	  is	  random	  play,	  but	  actually,	  senders	  lie	  
significantly	  less	  than	  predicted.	  The	  punishment	  game	  is	  set	  up	  to	  show	  that	  this	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result	  is	  due	  to	  a	  preference	  for	  truth	  telling	  amongst	  senders.	  	  
While,	  theoretically,	  senders	  should	  lie	  half	  the	  time,	  they	  find	  truth	  telling	  
happens	  55.07%	  of	  the	  time,	  which	  is	  a	  statistically	  significant	  amount	  of	  truth	  
telling	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  They	  further	  confirm	  previous	  studies	  by	  showing	  receivers	  
adjust	  their	  behavior	  toward	  more	  believing	  by	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
message	  58.7%	  of	  the	  time,	  a	  result	  that	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level.	  In	  
the	  punishment	  game,	  they	  find	  first	  that	  punishment	  does	  occur,	  and	  occurs	  most	  
often,	  25%	  of	  the	  time,	  after	  receivers	  trusted	  a	  lie.	  They	  further	  find	  that	  receivers	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  trust	  a	  message	  in	  the	  punishment	  game	  and	  that	  their	  likelihood	  
of	  trusting	  a	  message	  increases	  over	  time,	  likely	  due	  to	  public	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
punishment	  option	  and	  the	  receivers	  believing	  that	  having	  shown	  a	  willingness	  to	  
punish	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  sender	  will	  send	  a	  truthful	  message.	  	  
They	  then	  divide	  their	  data	  into	  two	  groups,	  those	  who	  punish	  liars	  
frequently	  after	  having	  been	  deceived,	  and	  everyone	  else.	  They	  find	  that	  the	  first	  
group	  accounts	  for	  nearly	  90%	  of	  all	  punishments.	  They	  call	  these	  individuals	  those	  
with	  a	  strong	  concern	  for	  procedural	  justice.	  They	  use	  this	  as	  evidence	  for,	  what	  
they	  call,	  morally	  consistent	  behavior,	  defined	  as	  individuals	  with	  a	  strong	  notion	  of	  
procedural	  justice	  who	  behave	  consistently	  across	  roles	  and	  are	  responsible	  for	  
nearly	  all	  the	  information	  transmitted	  by	  senders.	  They	  show	  that	  when	  this	  cohort	  
is	  excluded	  from	  analysis,	  the	  phenomena	  of	  excess	  truth	  telling	  disappears.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  personality	  types	  could	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  if	  some	  personality	  
types	  have	  a	  greater	  aversion	  to	  lying,	  while	  others	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  linked	  to	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a	  preference	  for	  justice.	  
Review	  of	  relevant	  risk	  measurement	  literature	  
Holt	  and	  Laury	  (2002)	  present	  a	  menu	  of	  paired	  lottery	  choices	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
to	  elicit	  a	  switching	  point	  to	  a	  high-­‐risk	  lottery	  to	  infer	  the	  degree	  of	  risk	  aversion.	  
The	  menu	  presents	  subjects	  with	  two	  lotteries	  at	  a	  time,	  one	  safer	  one	  riskier.	  For	  
each	  lottery,	  A	  and	  B,	  a	  probability,	  p,	  is	  given	  to	  the	  better	  outcome	  within	  the	  
lottery.	  P	  is	  then	  varied	  as	  subjects	  proceed	  through	  the	  experiment,	  which	  
eventually	  results	  in	  the	  elicitation	  of	  a	  crossover	  point.	  Expected	  payoff	  differences	  
between	  the	  two	  lotteries	  are	  set	  up	  such	  that	  the	  sooner	  a	  person	  switches	  from	  
lottery	  A	  to	  lottery	  B	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  risk	  aversion.	  That	  is	  in	  the	  initial	  round,	  only	  a	  
person	  with	  very	  little	  risk	  aversion	  will	  choose	  lottery	  B,	  in	  the	  final	  round	  only	  the	  
most	  risk	  averse	  person	  will	  choose	  lottery	  A,	  with	  a	  linear	  transition	  in	  risk-­‐
aversion	  to	  lottery	  choice	  as	  rounds	  progress.	  
They	  use	  treatments	  of	  high	  and	  low	  hypothetical	  and	  real	  payoffs	  and	  find	  
that	  a	  hybrid	  “power/expo”	  utility	  function	  with	  increasing	  relative	  and	  decreasing	  
absolute	  risk	  aversion	  replicates	  their	  results	  over	  a	  range	  of	  payoffs	  that	  ranges	  
from	  several	  dollars	  to	  several	  hundred	  dollars.	  They	  find,	  from	  both	  of	  these	  
sources,	  that	  subjects	  typically	  underestimate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  will	  avoid	  
risk,	  and	  that	  risk-­‐aversion,	  relative	  and	  absolute,	  exists.	  We	  deploy	  an	  identical	  
decision	  problem	  to	  elicit	  risk	  aversion	  rankings.	  
Review	  of	  relevant	  Big	  Five	  literature,	  and	  why	  personality	  is	  relevant	  to	  economics	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  Formal	  trait	  theories,	  which	  posit	  that	  overall	  personality	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  
its	  fundamental	  categories,	  known	  as	  traits,	  first	  began	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  1960s	  
(Nettle	  2009).	  While	  many	  jostled	  for	  dominance,	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  Big	  Five	  
locus	  of	  personality	  traits	  was	  forcefully	  argued	  for	  by	  Goldberg	  (1990)	  in	  his	  paper	  
titled	  “An	  alternative	  description	  of	  personality:	  The	  Big	  Five	  structure.”	  While	  a	  
large	  number	  of	  prominent	  researchers	  continue	  to	  propound	  other	  models,	  the	  Big	  
Five	  locus	  attained	  status	  as	  the	  most	  dominant	  (Nettle	  2009).	  
	   Goldberg	  (1990)	  counted	  1,710	  personality	  describing	  adjectives	  and	  
grouped	  them	  into	  75	  clusters.	  He	  then	  used	  several	  methods	  to	  see	  which	  factors	  
would	  emerge	  as	  the	  best	  generalizations	  of	  these	  clusters.	  This	  model	  ranked	  
individuals	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  one	  to	  five	  on	  the	  following	  five	  factors:	  openness	  to	  
experience,	  conscientiousness,	  extraversion,	  agreeableness,	  and	  neuroticism	  
(Goldberg	  1990).	  
He	  found	  that	  the	  Five	  Factor	  model	  formed	  the	  most	  useful	  distinctions.	  
Further,	  these	  methods	  showed	  that	  other	  factors	  were	  unnecessary	  in	  that	  they	  
either	  captured	  too	  few	  personality	  descriptors	  to	  warrant	  a	  separate	  category,	  or	  
they	  captured	  too	  many	  descriptors	  to	  remain	  useful.	  All	  the	  above	  methods	  of	  
calculating	  factor	  loadings	  showed	  little	  variation	  in	  the	  outcomes	  they	  generated,	  
and	  were	  also	  robust	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  trait	  clustering	  was	  done	  by	  the	  subject	  or	  
by	  his	  or	  her	  peers.	  Crucially,	  these	  factors	  had	  an	  orthogonal	  relationship	  to	  one	  
another,	  that	  is,	  they	  represented	  dimensions,	  not	  categories.	  This	  implies	  that	  not	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only	  are	  they	  the	  best	  distinctions,	  there	  is	  also	  little	  to	  no	  overlap	  between	  them	  
(Goldberg	  1990).	  
Late	  in	  the	  1990s,	  Goldberg	  spearheaded	  a	  project	  to	  make	  the	  use	  of	  trait	  
theories	  easier	  than	  ever.	  This	  project	  was	  ultimately	  known	  as	  the	  IPIP,	  or	  the	  
International	  Personality	  Item	  Pool.	  This	  project	  is	  reviewed	  ten	  years	  after	  its	  
inception	  by	  Goldberg	  et	  al	  (2006).	  
The	  IPIP	  placed	  inventory	  items	  into	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  the	  internet	  for	  
free.	  It	  contains	  psychometric	  characteristics	  of	  current	  IPIP	  scales,	  keys	  for	  scoring	  
set	  of	  scales,	  total	  set	  of	  IPIP	  items,	  and	  a	  repository	  for	  reports	  of	  studies	  conducted	  
using	  the	  IPIP.	  Thus,	  it	  provided	  a	  one	  stop	  shop	  for	  items,	  scales,	  calculation	  
methods,	  and	  potentially	  useful	  previously	  conducted	  research	  (Goldberg	  2006).	  
To	  be	  sure,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  scales	  in	  the	  IPIP	  are	  
proxies	  for	  scales	  originally	  developed	  for	  the	  various	  personality	  trait	  models.	  As	  
such,	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  may	  be	  imperfect.	  However,	  reliability	  
measures	  show	  that	  the	  scales	  in	  the	  IPIP	  can	  be	  more	  reliable	  than	  their	  parent	  
scales	  (Goldberg	  2006).	  Thus,	  we	  can	  be	  reasonably	  confident	  in	  using	  the	  IPIP	  to	  
construct	  reliable	  measures	  of	  the	  personality	  traits	  we	  are	  interested	  in.	  
Barrick	  and	  Mount	  (1991)	  examined	  the	  link	  between	  the	  Big	  Five	  
personality	  dimensions	  and	  job	  performance.	  They	  explore	  five	  different	  occupation	  
groups	  (professionals,	  police,	  managers,	  sales,	  and	  skilled/semi-­‐skilled)	  for	  three	  
performance	  criteria	  (job	  proficiency,	  training	  proficiency,	  and	  personnel	  data)	  
where	  performance	  is	  defined	  by	  salary	  level,	  status	  change,	  and	  tenure.	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They	  conduct	  their	  analysis	  first	  sorted	  by	  occupational	  group,	  and	  then	  by	  
the	  three	  criteria.	  When	  analyzing	  by	  occupational	  group,	  they	  found	  that	  
conscientiousness	  was	  indeed	  a	  valid	  positive	  predictor	  for	  all	  occupational	  
groupings.	  They	  did	  not	  find	  a	  link	  between	  neuroticism	  and	  job	  performance,	  
except	  for	  professionals,	  for	  whom	  there	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship.	  Finally,	  they	  
found	  that	  extraversion	  positively	  predicted	  success	  in	  jobs	  requiring	  interpersonal	  
skills,	  the	  same	  did	  not	  hold	  true	  for	  agreeableness.	  When	  sorting	  by	  criteria	  type,	  
they	  found	  that	  conscientiousness	  has	  a	  positive	  relationship	  with	  performance	  for	  
all	  three	  performance	  criteria.	  The	  hypothesized	  relationship	  between	  openness	  to	  
experience	  and	  job	  training	  success	  was	  also	  confirmed.	  They	  also	  found	  an	  un-­‐
hypothesized	  link	  between	  extraversion	  and	  job	  training	  success,	  with	  no	  other	  
significant	  findings.	  
They	  use	  these	  findings	  to	  make	  a	  number	  of	  interesting	  suggestions.	  First,	  
conscientiousness	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  predictor	  of	  job	  success	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
contexts.	  As	  such,	  they	  believe	  it	  should	  be	  incorporated	  into	  models	  that	  attempt	  to	  
explain	  workplace	  performance.	  It	  has	  been	  well	  established	  that	  mental	  ability	  is	  a	  
strong	  predictor	  of	  workplace	  success.	  Thus,	  they	  suggest	  that	  this	  fact	  along	  with	  
the	  fact	  that	  conscientiousness	  and	  intellect	  have	  little	  correlation	  implies	  that	  
conscientiousness	  may	  account	  for	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of	  job	  knowledge	  
and,	  therefore,	  in	  job	  performance.	  The	  link	  between	  openness	  to	  experience	  and	  
job	  training	  success	  suggests	  that	  openness	  is	  measuring	  an	  ability	  to	  learn	  as	  well	  
as	  a	  motivation	  to	  learn.	  Finally,	  to	  reconcile	  hypotheses	  on	  neuroticism	  with	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findings,	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  neuroticism	  and	  performance	  
of	  professionals	  could	  be	  a	  case	  of	  reverse	  causality	  where	  the	  high	  stress	  of	  
professional	  occupations	  causes	  individuals	  to	  exhibit	  neurotic	  traits	  (Barrick	  and	  
Mount	  1991).	  
Review	  of	  relevant	  literature	  that	  combines	  economics	  and	  personality	  psychology	  
	   Heckman	  (2011)	  reviewed	  the	  potential	  problems	  and	  benefits	  of	  integrating	  
psychology	  into	  economics.	  Personality	  psychology	  typically	  considers	  a	  wider	  array	  
of	  actions	  than	  are	  typically	  considered	  by	  economists,	  but	  personality	  
psychologists	  lack	  precise	  models,	  whereas	  economics	  provides	  such	  a	  framework.	  
Precise	  models	  reveal	  identification	  problems	  that	  plague	  measurement	  in	  
psychology	  research.	  	  
Heckman	  developed	  a	  model	  that	  defines	  personality	  as	  a	  response	  function	  
and	  the	  behavior	  that	  constitutes	  personality	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  pattern	  of	  action	  in	  
response	  to	  constraints,	  endowments,	  and	  incentives	  facing	  agents	  given	  their	  goals	  
and	  preferences.	  Then	  actions,	  not	  traits,	  constitute	  the	  data	  used	  to	  identify	  the	  
traits.	  Enduring	  actions,	  then,	  are	  the	  average	  of	  the	  response	  functions	  for	  a	  person	  
with	  a	  given	  vector	  of	  traits.	  Enduring	  traits	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  such	  
as	  averaging	  over	  a	  task	  variable,	  situation	  variable,	  or	  both.	  This	  provides	  us	  with	  
some	  theoretical	  underpinning	  for	  our	  goals.	  	  
Becker,	  Deckers,	  Dohmen,	  Falk,	  and	  Kosse	  (2012)	  sought	  to	  analyze	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  economic	  preferences	  and	  psychological	  concepts	  of	  personality	  are	  
related.	  They	  also	  investigated	  whether	  preference	  measures	  or	  economic	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preferences	  predict	  life	  outcomes.	  	  
They	  found	  little	  correlation	  between	  personality	  traits	  and	  preferences.	  
They	  also	  found	  that	  both	  have	  similar	  explanatory	  power	  when	  used	  separately	  in	  
predicting	  health,	  life	  satisfaction,	  earnings,	  unemployment,	  and	  education.	  When	  
life	  outcomes	  are	  regressed	  on	  both	  measurement	  systems,	  the	  explained	  fraction	  of	  
variance	  rises	  by	  60%.	  They	  conclude	  that	  both	  measurement	  systems	  capture	  
distinct	  sources	  of	  heterogeneity	  in	  life	  outcomes.	  They	  further	  conclude	  that	  the	  
two	  methods	  of	  describing	  behavior	  are	  complementary.	  	  
Becker	  et	  al	  (2012)	  measure	  time	  preference,	  risk,	  positive	  and	  negative	  
reciprocity,	  trust,	  and	  altruism	  using	  the	  following	  experiments,	  respectively:	  
switching	  point	  in	  preference	  in	  lists	  of	  choices	  between	  amount	  of	  money	  today	  vs.	  
amount	  of	  money	  tomorrow,	  switching	  point	  in	  preference	  lists	  of	  choices	  between	  
lotteries	  of	  varying	  safety,	  second-­‐mover	  behavior	  in	  the	  trust	  game,	  investment	  in	  
punishment	  after	  defection	  of	  opponent	  in	  a	  prisoner’s	  dilemma,	  first-­‐mover	  
behavior	  in	  the	  trust	  game,	  first-­‐mover	  behavior	  in	  a	  dictator	  game.	  	  
They	  found	  the	  following	  significant	  correlations	  at	  the	  10%,	  5%,	  and	  1%	  
levels,	  denoted	  by	  *,	  **,	  and	  ***	  respectively:	  
Table	  2.1	  –	  Personality/Economic	  Parameters	  
	   Open	   Consc	   Extravert	   Agreeable	   Neurotic	  
Time	   0.0370	   0.0057	   -­‐0.0084	   0.1026**	   -­‐0.0518	  
Risk	   -­‐0.0379	   -­‐0.0611	   0.0762*	   0.0202	   -­‐0.1201***	  
+	  Reciprocity	   0.1724	   0.0140	   0.0211	   0.2042***	   0.0361	  
-­‐	  Reciprocity	   -­‐0.0885*	   -­‐0.0393	   0.0943*	   -­‐0.1451***	   -­‐0.0136	  
Trust	   0.1232***	   0.1300***	   0.0004	   0.1665***	   -­‐0.0134	  
Altruism	   0.1242**	   -­‐0.0979*	   0.0249	   0.1911***	   0.0847*	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Overall,	  they	  found	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  association	  was	  low,	  which	  suggests	  a	  
complementary	  relationship.	  This	  suggestion	  is	  bolstered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  adjusted	  
R2	  for	  the	  connection	  between	  health,	  life	  satisfaction,	  earnings,	  unemployment,	  and	  
years	  of	  education	  are	  all	  better	  explained	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  preferences,	  Five-­‐
Factor,	  and	  locus	  of	  control	  in	  any	  combination	  than	  by	  themselves.	  We	  use	  this	  to	  
predict	  findings	  in	  our	  own	  analysis.	  
Lonnqvist,	  Verkasalo,	  and	  Walkowitz	  (2011)	  set	  up	  the	  following	  experiment.	  
A	  total	  of	  120	  participants	  were	  divided	  into	  groups	  of	  20	  and	  played	  either	  an	  
incentivized	  or	  hypothetical	  version	  of	  the	  prisoner’s	  dilemma.	  After	  the	  game,	  a	  Big	  
Five	  personality	  questionnaire	  was	  given.	  All	  games	  were	  one-­‐shot	  and	  all	  players	  
were	  matched	  randomly.	  Cooperation	  levels	  were	  variable	  such	  that	  several	  
different	  “levels”	  of	  cooperation	  were	  available.	  Participants	  were	  given	  an	  
endowment	  for	  which	  they	  had	  the	  option	  of	  sharing	  with	  a	  partner	  where	  the	  
amount	  given	  would	  be	  doubled	  (we	  should	  note	  that	  this	  experiment,	  though	  
described	  as	  a	  prisoners	  dilemma,	  is	  really	  a	  trust	  game).	  Along	  with	  the	  Big	  Five	  
questionnaire,	  risk	  attitude	  was	  also	  assessed	  by	  survey.	  	  
Their	  results	  are	  as	  follows.	  The	  researchers	  found	  that	  age	  and	  sex	  were	  not	  
significant,	  and	  found	  a	  series	  of	  correlations	  sorted	  by	  hypothetical	  and	  
incentivized.	  The	  hypothetical	  game	  showed	  either	  no	  statistically	  significant	  
personality	  factors	  and	  only	  had	  an	  R2	  of	  .02.	  The	  incentivized	  game	  found	  
significant	  relationships	  between	  amount	  transferred	  and	  low	  neuroticism	  and	  
openness	  to	  experience.	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Pothos,	  Perry,	  Corr,	  Matthew,	  and	  Busemeyer	  (2011)	  set	  up	  the	  following	  
experiment.	  A	  total	  sample	  size	  of	  113	  were	  partnered	  up	  and	  played	  a	  prisoner’s	  
dilemma	  game	  with	  instructions	  to	  maximize	  payoff.	  Payoffs	  were	  also	  in	  two	  
formats	  of	  high	  and	  low.	  Personality	  was	  then	  measured	  in	  both	  BIS	  (a	  scale	  that	  
measures	  impulsivity),	  and	  BAS	  (a	  scale	  that	  measures	  likelihood	  of	  acting	  on	  
desires)	  scales.	  	  
The	  researchers	  set	  up	  half	  of	  the	  games	  played	  such	  that	  the	  optimal	  
strategy	  was	  to	  cooperate,	  and	  the	  opposite	  for	  the	  second	  half.	  Pothos	  et	  al.	  
instructed	  players	  to	  maximize	  payoffs	  even	  though	  one	  can	  easily	  imagine	  a	  
scenario	  where	  a	  typically	  agreeable	  person	  would	  try	  to	  put	  aside	  a	  natural	  
inclination	  to	  cooperate	  since	  they	  have	  essentially	  been	  told	  to	  be	  focus	  only	  on	  
maximizing	  payoffs.	  	  
Their	  results	  are	  as	  follows.	  Significant	  correlations	  were	  found	  for	  
neuroticism	  and	  conscientiousness	  when	  the	  optimal	  strategy	  was	  to	  defect.	  
Significant	  correlations	  were	  found	  for	  agreeableness,	  extraversion,	  and	  openness	  to	  
experience	  when	  the	  optimal	  decision	  was	  to	  cooperate.	  
Other	  papers	  concerning	  the	  relations	  between	  measures	  of	  personality	  have	  
found	  the	  following.	  The	  connection	  between	  conscientiousness	  and	  the	  discount	  
rate	  is	  mixed	  with	  Daly	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  finding	  a	  negative	  relationship	  and	  Dohmen	  et	  
al.	  (2010)	  and	  Anderson	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  finding	  the	  opposite.	  Almlund	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  find	  
time	  preference	  is	  significantly	  correlated	  to	  agreeableness	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  This	  
finding	  is	  corroborated	  by	  Anderson	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  who	  find	  a	  relationship	  between	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delay	  acceptance	  and	  agreeableness.	  Dohmen	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  finds	  a	  significant	  
relationship	  between	  risk	  preference	  and	  openness	  to	  experience	  at	  the	  1%	  level,	  
and	  agreeableness	  at	  the	  5%	  level.	  Borghans	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  found	  a	  significant	  
positive	  relationship	  between	  risk	  aversion	  and	  neuroticism.	  Dohmen	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  
find	  that	  trust	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  agreeableness	  and	  openness	  to	  experience,	  and	  
negatively	  to	  conscientiousness	  and	  neuroticism.	  They	  further	  find	  that	  positive	  
reciprocity	  is	  related	  positively	  with	  all	  five	  facets,	  and	  negative	  reciprocity	  is	  
related	  negatively	  to	  conscientiousness	  and	  extraversion.	  Finally,	  altruism,	  as	  
measured	  by	  the	  dictator	  game,	  is	  related	  positively	  with	  extraversion	  by	  Ben-­‐Ner	  
and	  Kramer	  (2010).	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CHAPTER	  THREE	  
EXPERIMENT	  DESIGN	  
	   In	  this	  section,	  we	  review	  the	  personality	  questionnaire	  and	  each	  game	  
played.	  First	  we	  describe	  the	  general	  form	  of	  the	  game	  and	  personality	  
questionnaires.	  Next,	  we	  describe	  and	  provide	  intuitive	  rationalizations	  for	  our	  
choices	  of	  adjustable	  parameters	  and	  questionnaire	  items.	  Finally,	  we	  review	  the	  
key	  decisions	  made	  by	  participants	  and	  what	  we	  hope	  to	  learn	  from	  these	  decisions.	  	  
The	  Trust	  Game	  
	   In	  the	  trust	  game,	  players	  are	  paired,	  with	  one	  player	  taking	  the	  role	  of	  
sender,	  and	  the	  other	  player	  taking	  the	  role	  of	  receiver.	  The	  sender	  is	  given	  some	  
amount	  of	  money.	  The	  sender	  then	  decides	  how	  much	  of	  this	  amount,	  if	  any,	  to	  send	  
to	  the	  receiver.	  If	  the	  sender	  sends	  nothing,	  the	  game	  ends.	  If	  the	  sender	  sends	  any	  
amount,	  that	  amount	  is	  multiplied	  by	  some	  multiplier,	  and	  the	  new	  amount	  is	  
received	  by	  the	  receiver.	  The	  receiver	  must	  then	  decide	  how	  much	  of	  the	  amount	  
received	  to	  send	  back	  to	  the	  sender.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  game	  ends,	  regardless	  of	  how	  
much	  is	  sent	  back.	  The	  game	  can	  be	  played	  any	  number	  of	  times,	  with	  any	  number	  
as	  the	  multiplier,	  and	  with	  any	  kind	  of	  matching.	  	  	  
For	  our	  experiment,	  we	  chose	  to	  have	  participants	  play	  the	  game	  twice,	  once	  
as	  the	  sender	  and	  once	  as	  the	  receiver	  and	  matching	  was	  random	  both	  times.	  The	  
sender	  is	  given	  an	  endowment	  of	  $X.	  The	  investor	  can	  then	  invest	  any	  portion	  of	  this	  
endowment,	  that	  is,	   .	  We	  let	  T	  equal	  the	  amount	  sent	  so	  the	  sender	  keeps	  
X-­‐T.	  The	  amount	  sent	  is	  multiplied	  by	  some	  number,	  r.	  The	  other	  player	  receives	  
x ∈ [0 : X]
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this	  amount	  (r)(T).	  The	  receiver	  is	  then	  permitted	  to	  keep	  any	  portion	  of	  this	  
amount.	  If	  we	  let	  Y	  equal	  the	  amount	  kept	  by	  the	  receivers	  then	  the	  total	  payouts	  are	  
Y	  for	  the	  receiver	  and	  X-­‐Y+rT	  for	  the	  sender.	  The	  variables	  are	  given	  the	  following	  
values:	  X=$10,	  r=2.	  These	  figures	  are	  in	  experimental	  dollars,	  which	  were	  converted	  
to	  real	  dollars	  at	  an	  exchange	  rate	  or	  1	  ED	  =	  $0.25.	  All	  of	  the	  above	  information	  and	  
payouts	  were	  made	  known	  to	  participants	  after	  each	  round	  
The	  Minimum	  Effort	  Game	  
	   In	  the	  minimum	  effort	  game,	  participants	  are	  put	  into	  groups	  and	  choose	  
effort	  levels.	  Their	  payoff	  is	  determined	  by	  their	  own	  effort	  selection	  and	  the	  within	  
group	  minimum	  effort.	  Typically,	  the	  payoff	  will	  be	  decreasing	  in	  own	  effort,	  and	  
increasing	  in	  the	  minimum	  effort.	  We	  follow	  the	  example	  of	  Van	  Huyck	  1990	  in	  most	  
respects.	  Effort	  levels	  are	  bounded	  to	  integers	  from	  1	  to	  7,	  inclusive,	  with	  1	  
representing	  the	  lowest	  possible	  effort	  choice,	  and	  7	  representing	  the	  highest.	  The	  
payoff	  function	  was	  50	  plus	  20	  times	  the	  minimum	  effort	  minus	  10	  times	  own	  effort.	  
Stated	  precisely,	  individuals	  have	  payoff	  functions	  of	  
	  where	   	  is	  payoff	  for	  player	  I	  and	  
,	   .	  The	  multiplier	  parameters	  for	  the	  minimum	  and	  own	  
effort	  levels	  were	  chosen	  to	  create	  opposing	  incentives	  to	  raise	  and	  lower	  effort	  
levels.	  The	  addition	  of	  50	  to	  this	  payoff	  function	  was	  to	  eliminate	  negative	  payoffs.	  	  
Players	  were	  randomly	  matched	  into	  groups	  of	  3	  and	  played	  the	  game	  5	  
times.	  After	  these	  5	  rounds,	  players	  were	  randomly	  re-­‐matched	  into	  groups	  of	  3	  and	  
π i (e1,...,en ) = 50+ 20*min{e1,...,en}−10*ei π i
i ∈ {1,2,3} ei ∈ {1,2,..., 7}
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played	  the	  game	  5	  more	  times.	  Payoffs	  and	  the	  group	  minimum	  were	  revealed	  after	  
each	  round.	  
Group	  sizes	  were	  chosen	  based	  on	  previous	  evidence	  showing	  that	  group	  
sizes	  less	  than	  3	  tended	  to	  lead	  to	  convergence	  to	  the	  highest	  effort	  levels,	  while	  
group	  sizes	  greater	  than	  three	  tended	  to	  lead	  to	  convergence	  to	  the	  lowest	  effort	  
levels.	  Hence,	  a	  group	  size	  of	  3	  provided	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  variation	  to	  explain,	  
wherein	  group	  effects	  were	  minimized.	  Participants	  played	  the	  game	  5	  times	  due	  to	  
previous	  evidence	  suggesting	  coordination	  at	  an	  effort	  level	  tends	  to	  be	  reached	  at	  
around	  this	  mark.	  Players	  were	  re-­‐matched	  and	  played	  another	  5	  rounds	  simply	  to	  
maximize	  data	  output	  under	  time	  constraints.	  All	  payoffs	  were	  in	  experimental	  
dollars,	  which	  were	  converted	  to	  dollars	  using	  an	  exchange	  rate	  of	  1	  ED	  =	  $0.05.	  
Our	  first	  point	  of	  interest	  in	  this	  game	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  coordination	  
happens.	  Then	  we	  must	  see	  if	  coordination	  happens,	  and	  at	  what	  level	  of	  effort	  it	  
occurs.	  Since	  a	  higher	  effort	  choice	  is	  a	  risky	  move,	  we	  seek	  to	  compare	  what	  does	  a	  
better	  job	  of	  explaining	  choices,	  the	  Big	  Five	  locus	  of	  personality	  traits,	  religiosity,	  
risk	  aversion,	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  these.	  We	  then	  explore	  how	  personality	  traits	  
effect	  reactions	  to	  being	  the	  minimum	  in	  a	  given	  group.	  We	  also	  explore	  whether	  or	  
not	  personality	  traits	  impact	  coordination.	  Finally,	  we	  explore	  the	  relationship	  
between	  personality	  traits	  and	  risk	  aversion	  itself	  to	  see	  if	  a	  connection	  can	  be	  
forged	  between	  the	  two.	  	  The	  aforementioned	  are	  also	  sorted	  to	  observe	  if	  any	  
effects	  vary	  by	  gender.	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The	  Cheap	  Talk	  Game	  
	   Cheap	  talk	  games	  are	  a	  broad	  class	  of	  economic	  games.	  Their	  distinguishing	  
feature	  is	  that	  one	  party	  has	  access	  to	  information	  that	  another	  interested	  party	  
does	  not.	  Further,	  the	  information	  can	  be	  passed	  along	  by	  the	  information	  carrying	  
party,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  way	  for	  others	  to	  verify	  this	  information.	  	  
	   In	  our	  experiment,	  we	  randomly	  pair	  participants,	  who	  are	  then	  given	  the	  
role	  of	  either	  sender	  or	  receiver.	  The	  sender	  receives	  information	  regarding	  payoffs	  
contained	  in	  a	  decision	  between	  two	  choices,	  called	  A	  and	  B.	  The	  sender	  then	  
decides	  on	  a	  message	  to	  send	  to	  the	  receiver.	  The	  first	  message	  states,	  “Prize	  A	  earns	  
the	  Sender	  more	  than	  the	  Receiver,”	  while	  the	  second	  message	  states	  “Prize	  B	  earns	  
the	  Sender	  more	  than	  the	  Receiver.”	  The	  payoffs	  in	  the	  two	  choices	  are	  always	  the	  
inverse	  of	  one	  another,	  so	  if	  one	  gives	  the	  sender	  X	  and	  the	  receiver	  Y,	  the	  other	  
gives	  the	  sender	  Y	  and	  the	  receiver	  X.	  Payoffs	  ranged	  between	  10	  and	  100	  inclusive,	  
in	  increments	  of	  10,	  that	  is,	   .	  Upon	  receiving	  the	  message,	  the	  
receiver	  chooses	  amongst	  the	  options.	  The	  game	  ends	  once	  the	  receiver	  makes	  a	  
decision.	  Payoffs	  are	  then	  revealed	  and	  subjects	  are	  randomly	  re-­‐matched	  and	  play	  
the	  game	  again.	  All	  subjects	  played	  the	  game	  a	  total	  of	  16	  times,	  alternating	  between	  
the	  roles	  of	  sender	  and	  receiver.	  All	  payoffs	  are	  in	  experimental	  dollars	  which	  are	  
converted	  to	  real	  dollars	  at	  an	  exchange	  rate	  of	  1	  ED	  =	  $0.05.	  This	  is	  a	  game	  with	  
only	  mixed	  strategy	  equilibria	  where	  both	  senders	  and	  receivers	  randomize	  truth	  
telling	  and	  message	  believing.	  
π (S,R) ∈ {10,20,...,100}
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   The	  phenomenon	  of	  cheap	  talk	  can	  be	  explored	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  and	  this	  
set	  up	  provided	  us	  with	  the	  simplest	  context	  to	  conduct	  this	  exploration.	  The	  
repeated	  game	  allows	  us	  to	  examine	  the	  interaction	  between	  personality	  traits	  and	  
history.	  	  
Risk	  Aversion	  Assessment	  
	  	   This	  class	  of	  decision	  problems	  is	  typically	  played	  to	  get	  a	  pure	  measure	  of	  
risk	  aversion	  amongst	  participants.	  Since	  we	  seek	  to	  gather	  as	  pure	  a	  measure	  of	  
risk	  aversion	  as	  possible	  for	  use	  in	  analysis	  of	  the	  other	  games,	  our	  setup	  almost	  
exactly	  mirrors	  the	  Holt	  and	  Laury	  2002	  design	  and	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  
table:	  	  
Table	  3.1	  –	  Risk	  Lotteries	  
Choice	   Option	  A	   Option	  B	  
1	   1/10	  of	  $2.00,	  9/10	  of	  $1.60	   1/10	  of	  $3.85,	  9/10	  of	  $0.10	  
2	   2/10	  of	  $2.00,	  8/10	  of	  $1.60	   2/10	  of	  $3.85,	  8/10	  of	  $0.10	  
3	   3/10	  of	  $2.00,	  7/10	  of	  $1.60	   3/10	  of	  $3.85,	  7/10	  of	  $0.10	  
4	   4/10	  of	  $2.00,	  6/10	  of	  $1.60	   4/10	  of	  $3.85,	  6/10	  of	  $0.10	  
5	   5/10	  of	  $2.00,	  5/10	  of	  $1.60	   5/10	  of	  $3.85,	  5/10	  of	  $0.10	  
6	   6/10	  of	  $2.00,	  4/10	  of	  $1.60	   6/10	  of	  $3.85,	  4/10	  of	  $0.10	  
7	   7/10	  of	  $2.00,	  3/10	  of	  $1.60	   7/10	  of	  $3.85,	  3/10	  of	  $0.10	  
8	   8/10	  of	  $2.00,	  2/10	  of	  $1.60	   8/10	  of	  $3.85,	  2/10	  of	  $0.10	  
9	   9/10	  of	  $2.00,	  1/10	  of	  $1.60	   9/10	  of	  $3.85,	  1/10	  of	  $0.10	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Payoffs	  are	  in	  real	  dollars	  and	  are	  given	  for	  1	  of	  the	  9	  rounds.	  The	  round	  for	  which	  
payoff	  is	  made	  is	  decided	  randomly	  by	  a	  random	  number	  generator	  prior	  to	  the	  
experiment.	  This	  information,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  disclosed	  to	  participants.	  Risk	  
aversion	  is	  calculated	  by	  observing	  the	  switching	  point	  from	  gamble	  B	  to	  gamble	  A.	  
The	  Personality	  Questionnaire	  
	   With	  the	  Five	  Factor	  model,	  participants	  answer	  questions	  which	  are	  used	  to	  
determine	  how	  they	  rank	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  5	  on	  5	  different	  personality	  traits:	  
openness	  to	  experience,	  conscientiousness,	  extraversion,	  agreeableness,	  and	  
neuroticism	  “(OCEAN)”.	  	  
Openness	  to	  experience	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  whether	  an	  individual	  is	  
inventive	  or	  curious	  versus	  consistent	  or	  cautious,	  where	  a	  low	  rating	  implies	  the	  
latter	  and	  a	  high	  rating	  implies	  the	  former.	  Conscientiousness	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  
whether	  a	  person	  is	  efficient	  and	  organized	  versus	  easy-­‐going	  and	  carefree,	  with	  a	  
low	  rating	  implies	  the	  latter	  and	  a	  high	  ranking	  implies	  the	  former.	  Extraversion	  is	  
meant	  to	  capture	  whether	  a	  person	  is	  solitary	  and	  reserved	  verses	  outgoing	  and	  
energetic,	  with	  a	  low	  rating	  implying	  the	  former	  and	  a	  high	  rating	  implying	  the	  
latter.	  Agreeableness	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  whether	  a	  person	  is	  cold	  and	  unkind	  
versus	  friendly	  and	  compassionate,	  with	  a	  low	  rating	  implying	  the	  former	  and	  a	  high	  
rating	  implying	  the	  latter.	  Neuroticism	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  whether	  a	  person	  is	  
sensitive	  and	  nervous	  versus	  secure	  and	  confident,	  with	  a	  low	  rating	  implying	  the	  
latter	  and	  a	  high	  rating	  implying	  the	  former.	  	  
	   35	  
These	  factors	  are	  assessed	  using	  self-­‐reported	  answers	  to	  questions.	  A	  large	  
repository	  of	  the	  questions	  used	  is	  the	  International	  Personality	  Item	  Pool	  (IPIP).	  
This	  repository	  contains	  a	  massive	  number	  of	  questions	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  elicit	  
rating	  on	  the	  Big	  Five	  locus	  of	  personality	  traits,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  traits.	  We	  selected	  
questions	  from	  this	  database	  to	  assess	  how	  participants	  rate	  on	  the	  Big	  Five,	  along	  
with	  religiosity.	  Prior	  to	  playing	  the	  games,	  each	  participant	  completed	  a	  
questionnaire	  that	  consisted	  of	  a	  fixed	  number	  of	  randomly	  selected	  questions	  from	  
a	  subset	  of	  the	  questions	  available	  in	  the	  IPIP.	  Specifically,	  we	  used	  ten	  items	  for	  
each	  of	  the	  Big	  Five	  traits,	  plus	  seven	  additional	  items	  for	  religiosity,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  57	  
items.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  questionnaire	  we	  also	  requested	  information	  regarding	  
gender,	  race,	  high	  school	  attended,	  major,	  and	  a	  unique	  identifying	  number.	  
Although	  names	  were	  initially	  collected	  to	  aid	  in	  ensuring	  the	  correct	  individuals	  
came	  to	  the	  ensuing	  lab	  sessions,	  this	  information	  was	  discarded	  along	  with	  all	  
other	  identifying	  information	  after	  subjects	  had	  their	  personality	  and	  lab	  data	  
paired





A	  total	  of	  84	  participants	  were	  recruited	  via	  word	  of	  mouth,	  e-­‐mails	  to	  
students	  who	  had	  previously	  expressed	  interest	  in	  participating	  in	  experiments,	  and	  
announcements	  in	  classrooms.	  All	  participants	  were	  students	  at	  Clemson	  University.	  
Subjects	  were	  told	  said	  that	  participation	  entailed	  an	  online	  questionnaire	  that	  took	  
20	  minutes	  to	  complete	  and	  a	  one-­‐hour	  long	  lab	  session.	  	  
Upon	  signing	  up	  for	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  directed	  to	  a	  link	  to	  
the	  online	  survey,	  administered	  through	  Survey	  Monkey.	  The	  survey	  used	  items	  
from	  the	  IPIP	  designed	  to	  elicit	  rankings	  on	  scales	  for	  openness	  to	  experience,	  
conscientiousness,	  extraversion,	  agreeableness,	  neuroticism,	  and	  religiosity.	  The	  
questionnaire	  also	  gathered	  the	  demographic	  information	  of	  gender,	  race,	  age,	  
course	  of	  study,	  and	  region	  of	  origin.	  Participants	  were	  assigned	  to	  lab	  sessions	  of	  
either	  12	  or	  18.	  Sessions	  occurred	  between	  a	  day	  and	  a	  week	  following	  completion	  
of	  the	  questionnaire.	  	  
Upon	  entering	  the	  lab,	  participants	  were	  given	  two	  sets	  of	  instructions,	  one	  
explaining	  the	  general	  procedure	  of	  the	  experiment	  and	  the	  other	  explaining	  how	  to	  
play	  the	  first	  game.	  We	  randomized	  the	  order	  of	  the	  games	  for	  each	  lab	  session.	  All	  
instructions	  were	  read	  aloud.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  each	  game,	  participants	  were	  given	  a	  
copy	  of	  the	  instructions	  for	  the	  next	  game.	  All	  the	  instructions	  are	  included	  in	  the	  
appendix.	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Once	  all	  games	  were	  completed,	  participants	  entered	  in	  identification	  
numbers	  used	  in	  online	  surveys.	  This	  was	  used	  to	  connect	  questionnaire	  and	  lab	  
data.	  Participants	  were	  then	  shown	  their	  total	  earnings.	  Earnings	  were	  then	  
distributed	  and	  the	  lab	  session	  was	  concluded.	  The	  minimum	  payoff	  was	  $14.40,	  the	  
maximum	  was	  $25.70,	  and	  the	  mean	  was	  $19.80.	  The	  games	  were	  played	  on	  
computer	  terminals	  and	  coded	  in	  zTree.
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CHAPTER	  FIVE	  
RESULTS	  
We	  begin	  with	  baseline	  results	  regarding	  our	  sample.	  Next	  we	  show	  results	  
from	  the	  questionnaire	  and	  look	  at	  reliability	  estimates.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  
summary	  statistics	  for	  the	  risk	  problem,	  since	  that	  is	  also	  a	  dependent	  variable.	  
Then,	  since	  a	  number	  of	  different	  games	  were	  played,	  with	  varying	  objectives	  and	  
questions	  of	  interest,	  we	  break	  down	  our	  review	  of	  results	  by	  game.	  First,	  we	  will	  
look	  at	  results	  from	  the	  Trust	  Game,	  then	  the	  Minimum	  Effort	  Game,	  and	  finally,	  the	  
Cheap	  Talk	  game.	  Where	  appropriate,	  we	  conduct	  chow	  tests	  to	  see	  whether	  sorted	  
analysis	  is	  appropriate,	  though	  we	  include	  results	  regardless	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
consistency	  in	  analysis,	  while	  noting	  the	  results	  of	  the	  chow	  test	  in	  question.	  
Dependent	  Variables	  
	   Among	  the	  84	  subjects,	  there	  were	  44	  men,	  36	  women,	  and	  4	  who	  did	  not	  
disclose	  their	  gender.	  60	  participants	  were	  Caucasian,	  20	  were	  not,	  and	  4	  did	  not	  
disclose	  their	  race.	  The	  average	  participant	  was	  20.825	  years	  old.	  Tables	  showing	  
results	  for	  all	  specifications	  for	  each	  game	  are	  included	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  discussions	  
of	  each	  game.	  Standard	  errors	  are	  in	  parentheses	  and	  asterisks	  are	  used	  to	  indicate	  
degree	  of	  significance.	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Table	  5.1.1	  –	  Personality	  Traits	  Correlation	  Coefficients	  
	   Open	   Consc	   Extravert	   Agreeable	   Neurotic	   Religious	  
Open	   1.0000	   	   	   	   	   	  
Consc	   0.1657	   1.0000	   	   	   	   	  
Extravert	   0.3642	   0.1983	   1.0000	   	   	   	  
Agreeable	   0.2577	   0.1158	   0.1703	   1.0000	   	   	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.1893	   0.1941	   0.3573	   -­‐0.1668	   1.0000	   	  
Religious	   0.1685	   0.1950	   0.1271	   0.2293	   0.0707	   1.0000	  
	  	  
	   A	  table	  of	  estimated	  internal	  consistency	  reliability	  of	  the	  Big	  Five	  and	  
religiosity	  is	  produced	  below.	  
	  




Cronbach’s	  alpha	  is	  a	  coefficient	  of	  reliability.	  The	  closer	  this	  value	  is	  to	  1,	  the	  
more	  reliable	  is	  the	  measure.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  our	  measures	  are	  fairly	  reliable,	  with	  
the	  mild	  exception	  of	  openness	  to	  experience.	  Further,	  the	  means	  and	  standard	  
deviations	  are	  well	  within	  the	  range	  of	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  typical	  results.	  
	   For	  the	  our	  analysis,	  unless	  indicated	  otherwise,	  we	  test	  models	  of	  the	  Big	  
Five,	  the	  Big	  Five	  plus	  religiosity,	  demographics,	  the	  previous	  three	  combined,	  risk	  
aversion,	  and	  historical	  and/or	  contextual	  variables,	  as	  appropriate.	  In	  the	  interest	  
of	  consistency	  and	  understandability,	  they	  are	  always	  presented	  and	  discussed	  in	  
this	  order.	  The	  Big	  Five	  and	  religiosity	  are	  continuous	  from	  1	  to	  5.	  The	  age	  variable	  
maps	  individual	  aged	  from	  18	  through	  65	  from	  1	  to	  48	  in	  order,	  with	  49	  signifying	  
Table	  5.1.2	  –	  Internal	  Consistency	  of	  Big	  Five	  
	   #	  of	  Items	   M	   SD	   Cronbach’s	  Alpha	  
Neurotic	   10	   2.549	   .693	   .828	  
Extraverst	   10	   3.587	   .676	   .867	  
Open	   10	   3.743	   .463	   .667	  
Agreeablen	   10	   3.826	   .544	   .794	  
Consc	   10	   3.851	   .604	   .857	  
Religious	   7	   3.811	   .996	   .903	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and	  age	  of	  66	  or	  higher;	  Race	  is	  categorical	  where	  1	  is	  Caucasian	  (White),	  and	  0	  
otherwise;	  Gender	  is	  1	  for	  female,	  2	  for	  male;	  Risk	  aversion	  ranges	  continuously	  
from	  1	  to	  2.	  Historical	  and	  contextual	  variables	  are	  explained	  where	  appropriate.	  	  
The	  Trust	  Game	  
	   Average	  proportions	  sent	  and	  returned	  are	  produced	  in	  the	  table	  below,	  with	  
standard	  deviations	  below,	  in	  parentheses.	  	  	  
Table	  5.2.1	  –	  Trust	  Game	  Summary	  
	   Proportion	  Sent	   Proportion	  Returned	  
Overall	   0.4024	   0.2389	  
	   (0.3253)	   (0.2600)	  
Men	   0.4318	   0.1864	  
	   (0.3555)	   (0.2475)	  
Women	   0.3416	   0.2784	  
	   (0.2623)	   (0.2740)	  
	  
	   The	  first	  decision	  we	  need	  to	  explain	  in	  the	  trust	  game	  is	  that	  of	  the	  amount	  
sent	  by	  the	  sender	  to	  the	  receiver.	  In	  the	  first	  model,	  we	  see	  the	  strongest	  effects	  
from	  conscientiousness,	  agreeableness,	  and	  neuroticism.	  A	  rise	  in	  conscientiousness	  
of	  1	  reduces	  amount	  sent	  by	  -­‐0.861,	  all	  else	  constant.	  Agreeableness	  has	  a	  positive	  
magnitude	  of	  0.984,	  while	  neuroticism	  has	  a	  positive	  magnitude	  of	  0.645,	  with	  
similar	  interpretations.	  However,	  none	  of	  these	  effects	  are	  significant.	  Adding	  
religiosity	  does	  little	  to	  change	  the	  results.	  Analyzing	  demographics	  shows	  an	  
insignificant	  magnitude	  of	  0.928	  for	  gender,	  and	  little	  else	  of	  note.	  Combining	  these	  
models	  shows	  the	  most	  pronounced	  magnitudes	  for	  conscientiousness,	  
agreeableness,	  neuroticism,	  race	  and	  gender.	  A	  one	  unit	  rise	  in	  agreeableness	  (all	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else	  constant)	  increases	  amount	  sent	  by	  1.251,	  with	  similar	  interpretations	  for	  
conscientiousness	  (-­‐0.592),	  neuroticism	  (0.941),	  race	  (-­‐0.789),	  and	  gender	  (1.568).	  
Of	  these,	  agreeableness,	  neuroticism,	  and	  gender	  achieve	  significance	  at	  the	  0.1	  
level.	  Risk	  aversion	  has	  an	  insignificant	  magnitude	  of	  0.448,	  but	  has	  an	  R-­‐squared	  
value	  of	  0,	  and	  so	  is	  excluded	  from	  further	  analysis.	  We	  should	  note	  that	  the	  model	  
of	  traits	  and	  demographics	  has	  an	  R-­‐squared	  of	  0.12,	  which	  means	  only	  12%	  of	  
variation	  is	  explained	  by	  this	  model.	  These	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  full	  in	  the	  
following	  table.	  	  
Table	  5.2.2	  –	  Amount	  Sent	  Overall	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Amount	  Sent	  (N=80)	  
	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   Model	  5	  
Openness	   0.113	   0.302	   	   0.059	   	  
	   (0.87)	   (0.87)	   	   (0.83)	   	  
Consc	   -­‐0.861	   -­‐0.960	   	   -­‐0.592	   	  
	   (0.58)	   (0.58)	   	   (0.61)	   	  
Extravert	   0.128	   0.034	   	   -­‐0.058	   	  
	   (0.65)	   (0.65)	   	   (0.72)	   	  
Agreeable	   0.984	   0.855	   	   1.251*	   	  
	   (0.64)	   (0.68)	   	   (0.70)	   	  
Neurotic	   0.645	   0.568	   	   0.941*	   	  
	   (0.55)	   (0.55)	   	   (0.54)	   	  
Religious	   	   0.249	   	   0.312	   	  
	   	   (0.35)	   	   (0.35)	   	  
Age	   	   	   -­‐0.026	   -­‐0.041	   	  
	   	   	   (0.17)	   (0.17)	   	  
White	   	   	   -­‐0.242	   -­‐0.789	   	  
	   	   	   (0.99)	   (1.10)	   	  
Male	   	   	   0.928	   1.568*	   	  
	   	   	   (0.73)	   (0.83)	   	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   0.448	  
	   	   	   	   	   (2.12)	  
Constant	   1.023	   0.760	   2.765*	   -­‐3.734	   3.540	  
	   (4.62)	   (4.62)	   (1.50)	   (5.20)	   (3.13)	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.068	   0.073	   0.021	   0.120	   0.00	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	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   Next,	  we	  conduct	  the	  same	  analysis	  as	  above,	  but	  sorted	  by	  period.	  This	  is	  
especially	  beneficial	  in	  our	  design	  since	  all	  participants	  who	  played	  sender	  in	  the	  
first	  round	  played	  receiver	  in	  the	  second,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Hence,	  the	  cohort	  analyzed	  
in	  each	  period	  has	  no	  overlap.	  Chow	  tests	  showed	  that	  analysis	  by	  period	  was	  
warranted	  for	  all	  three	  models.	  For	  the	  first	  period,	  the	  first	  model	  shows	  notable	  
magnitudes	  from	  openness	  (-­‐0.934),	  conscientiousness	  (-­‐1.032),	  and	  agreeableness	  
(1.915).	  Of	  these,	  agreeableness	  achieves	  significance	  at	  the	  0.1	  level,	  meaning	  a	  one	  
unit	  rise	  in	  agreeableness	  increases	  amount	  sent	  by	  1.915,	  in	  the	  first	  period,	  all	  else	  
constant.	  Adding	  religiosity	  lowers	  the	  magnitudes	  of	  openness	  (-­‐0.712),	  
conscientiousness	  (-­‐1.251),	  and	  agreeableness	  (1.626),	  with	  conscientiousness	  now	  
achieving	  significance	  at	  the	  0.1	  level.	  Adding	  demographics	  raises	  the	  negative	  
impact	  of	  openness	  (-­‐0.805),	  reduces	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  conscientiousness	  (-­‐
0.879),	  and	  raises	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  agreeableness	  (1.885),	  with	  only	  
agreeableness	  achieving	  significance	  at	  the	  0.1	  level.	  Race	  and	  gender	  also	  show	  
notable	  effects	  of	  -­‐1.067	  and	  1.633,	  respectively.	  	  
	   In	  the	  second	  period,	  the	  first	  model	  shows	  notable	  magnitudes	  from	  
openness	  (0.997),	  conscientiousness	  (-­‐0.845),	  extraversion	  (0.873),	  and	  neuroticism	  
(1.529),	  with	  neuroticism	  achieving	  significance	  at	  the	  0.1	  level,	  implying	  a	  one	  unit	  
rise	  in	  neuroticism	  increases	  amount	  sent	  in	  the	  second	  period	  by	  1.529.	  Adding	  
religiosity	  has	  a	  small	  effect	  on	  estimates.	  Adding	  demographics	  slightly	  raises	  the	  
magnitude	  for	  openness	  (1.007),	  lowers	  the	  magnitude	  for	  conscientiousness	  (-­‐
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0.723),	  raises	  the	  magnitude	  of	  extraversion	  (1.455),	  and	  raises	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
neuroticism	  (1.783),	  with	  neuroticism	  achieving	  significance	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  
Agreeableness	  is	  notably	  absent	  from	  these	  results.	  Further,	  the	  effect	  of	  
neuroticism	  is	  felt	  far	  more	  in	  the	  second	  period	  than	  in	  the	  first.	  It	  appears	  that	  
with	  no	  history,	  agreeableness	  is	  the	  best	  predictor	  of	  amount	  sent.	  However,	  after	  
just	  one	  round	  of	  play	  as	  the	  receiver,	  neurotic	  individuals	  tend	  to	  send	  more.	  	  
These	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  full	  in	  the	  following	  table.	  	  
 
Table	  5.2.3	  –	  Amount	  Sent	  by	  Period	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Amount	  Sent	  (N=40)	  
	   	   Period	  1	   	   	   Period	  2	   	  
	   Model	  6	   Model	  7	   Model	  8	   Model	  9	   Model	  10	   Model	  11	  
Openness	   -­‐0.934	   -­‐0.712	   -­‐0.805	   0.997	   0.957	   1.007	  	  	  	  
	   (0.97)	   (0.95)	   (0.93)	   (0.93)	   (1.01)	   (1.12)	  	  	  	  
Consc	   -­‐1.032	   -­‐1.251*	   -­‐0.879	   -­‐0.845	   -­‐0.834	   -­‐0.723	  	  	  	  
	   (0.72)	   (0.69)	   (0.80)	   (0.91)	   (0.98)	   (1.13)	  	  	  	  
Extravert	   0.162	   0.024	   -­‐0.162	   0.873	   0.892	   1.455	  	  	  	  
	   (0.81)	   (0.78)	   (0.98)	   (1.01)	   (1.08)	   (1.54)	  	  	  	  
Agreeable	   1.915*	   1.626	   1.885*	   0.277	   0.294	   0.322	  	  	  	  
	   (0.98)	   (1.04)	   (0.97)	   (0.73)	   (0.70)	   (0.91)	  	  	  	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.167	   -­‐0.320	   0.089	   1.529*	   1.540*	   1.783**	  	  
	   (0.65)	   (0.64)	   (0.78)	   (0.81)	   (0.79)	   (0.83)	  	  	  	  
Religious	   	   0.473	   0.575	   	   -­‐0.039	   0.104	  	  	  	  
	   	   (0.45)	   (0.43)	   	   (0.57)	   (0.57)	  	  	  	  
Age	   	   	   -­‐0.133	   	   	   0.225	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.22)	   	   	   (0.27)	  	  	  	  
White	   	   	   -­‐1.067	   	   	   -­‐0.949	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (1.67)	   	   	   (1.64)	  	  	  	  
Male	   	   	   1.663	   	   	   0.469	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (1.19)	   	   	   (1.18)	  	  	  	  
Constant	   4.652	   4.816	   0.694	   -­‐5.498	   -­‐5.408	   -­‐10.313	  	  	  	  
	   (5.86)	   (5.65)	   (6.17)	   (5.80)	   (6.07)	   (7.88)	  	  	  	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.159	   0.185	   0.269	   0.140	   0.140	   0.188	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	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   Next,	  we	  seek	  to	  explain	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  amount	  received	  that	  is	  
returned	  by	  receivers.	  The	  first	  model	  shows	  notable	  positive	  magnitudes	  from	  
neuroticism	  (0.108)	  and	  agreeableness	  (0.086).	  These	  two	  factors	  are	  significant	  at	  
the	  0.1	  and	  0.05	  levels,	  respectively.	  Adding	  religiosity,	  demographics,	  or	  both	  does	  
little	  to	  alter	  these	  results.	  Agreeableness	  is	  no	  longer	  significant,	  and	  neuroticism	  is	  
the	  only	  factor	  that	  remains	  significant	  throughout	  and	  maintains	  a	  magnitude	  of	  
about	  0.1,	  meaning	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  neuroticism	  raises	  the	  proportion	  
returned	  by	  0.1.	  These	  results	  are	  reproduced	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  
Table	  5.2.4	  –	  Proportion	  Returned	  Overall	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Proportion	  Returned	  (N=80)	  
	   Model	  12	   Model	  13	   Model	  14	   Model	  15	  
Openness	   -­‐0.018	   -­‐0.024	   	   -­‐0.004	  
	   (0.08)	   (0.09)	   	   (0.10)	  
Consc	   0.008	   0.011	   	   0.017	  
	   (0.06)	   (0.06)	   	   (0.06)	  
Extravert	   0.019	   0.021	   	   0.031	  
	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   	   (0.06)	  
Agreeable	   0.086*	   0.089	   	   0.091	  
	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   	   (0.06)	  
Neurotic	   0.108**	   0.111*	   	   0.099*	  
	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   	   (0.05)	  
Religious	   	   -­‐0.006	   	   -­‐0.004	  
	   	   (0.04)	   	   (0.04)	  
Age	   	   	   0.016	   0.020	  
	   	   	   (0.02)	   (0.02)	  
White	   	   	   0.059	   0.032	  
	   	   	   (0.07)	   (0.08)	  
Male	   	   	   -­‐0.095	   -­‐0.042	  
	   	   	   (0.07)	   (0.07)	  
Constant	   -­‐0.389	   -­‐0.381	   0.267*	   -­‐0.548	  
	   (0.46)	   (0.47)	   (0.14)	   (0.43)	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.093	   0.094	   0.051	   0.124	  	  
	  	   *p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	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   Next,	  we	  separate	  our	  results	  by	  period	  to	  see	  if	  behavior	  is	  impacted	  by	  
different	  factors	  with	  and	  without	  history.	  Chow	  tests	  revealed	  coefficients	  were	  
different	  from	  the	  overall	  analysis	  at	  the	  0.05	  level	  for	  the	  personality	  and	  
personality	  plus	  religiosity	  models,	  but	  not	  for	  risk	  aversion.	  In	  the	  first	  period,	  the	  
first	  model	  shows	  notable	  magnitudes	  from	  agreeableness	  (0.125)	  and	  neuroticism	  
(0.142),	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  and	  0.1	  levels,	  respectively.	  These	  magnitudes	  change	  
little	  after	  adding	  religiosity.	  Adding	  demographics	  strengthens	  the	  effect	  of	  
agreeableness	  (0.187)	  and	  minimally	  alters	  the	  effect	  of	  neuroticism	  (0.148).	  Both	  
results	  are	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  Further,	  race	  is	  revealed	  to	  have	  a	  magnitude	  
of	  0.245,	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level.	  In	  the	  second	  period,	  however,	  most	  of	  these	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Table	  5.2.5	  –	  Proportion	  Returned	  by	  Period	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Proportion	  Returned	  (N=40)	  
	   	   Period	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Period	  2	  
	   Model	  17	   Model	  18	   Model	  19	   Model	  21	   Model	  22	   Model	  23	  
Openness	   0.053	   0.017	   0.045	   -­‐0.094	   -­‐0.064	   -­‐0.041	  
	   (0.08)	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   (0.15)	   (0.15)	   (0.17)	  
Consc	   -­‐0.086	   -­‐0.077	   -­‐0.082	   0.095	   0.047	   0.020	  
	   (0.10)	   (0.10)	   (0.08)	   (0.09)	   (0.09)	   (0.08)	  
Extravert	   0.013	   0.030	   -­‐0.001	   0.021	   0.005	   0.017	  
	   (0.12)	   (0.13)	   (0.14)	   (0.06)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	  
Agreeable	   0.125**	   0.137**	   0.187**	   0.012	   -­‐0.045	   -­‐0.093	  
	   (0.06)	   (0.06)	   (0.09)	   (0.08)	   (0.08)	   (0.11)	  
Neurotic	   0.142*	   0.152**	   0.148**	   0.042	   -­‐0.011	   -­‐0.001	  
	   (0.08)	   (0.07)	   (0.07)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.07)	  
Religious	   	   -­‐0.030	   -­‐0.032	   	   0.076*	   0.081*	  
	   	   (0.06)	   (0.06)	   	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	  
Age	   	   	   0.043*	   	   	   -­‐0.018	  
	   	   	   (0.03)	   	   	   (0.03)	  
White	   	   	   0.245*	   	   	   -­‐0.026	  
	   	   	   (0.13)	   	   	   (0.10)	  
Male	   	   	   0.008	   	   	   -­‐0.056	  
	   	   	   (0.09)	   	   	   (0.09)	  
Constant	   -­‐0.483	   -­‐0.405	   -­‐0.925	   -­‐0.052	   0.123	   0.403	  
	   (0.51)	   (0.59)	   (0.56)	   (0.79)	   (0.74)	   (0.65)	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.190	   0.197	   0.317	   0.100	   0.172	   0.197	  
	  	  	  	  	  *	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
	   In	  summary,	  exploring	  results	  by	  period	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  
explore	  behavior	  in	  the	  trust	  game.	  For	  both	  decisions,	  we	  saw	  that	  explaining	  
behavior	  was	  easier	  when	  sorting	  results	  by	  period.	  For	  the	  amount	  sent	  decision,	  in	  
the	  first	  period,	  the	  most	  notable	  predictor	  was	  agreeableness,	  which	  had	  a	  positive	  
effect.	  In	  the	  second	  period,	  however,	  the	  effect	  of	  agreeableness	  was	  smaller,	  while	  
the	  effects	  of	  extraversion	  and	  neuroticism	  became	  more	  pronounced,	  neuroticism	  
significantly	  so.	  Gender	  also	  had	  an	  effect	  with	  men	  typically	  sending	  more	  than	  
women.	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   For	  proportion	  returned,	  we	  noticed	  that	  the	  strongest	  influence	  of	  
personality	  traits	  was	  in	  the	  first	  period	  from	  agreeableness	  and	  neuroticism,	  both	  
in	  the	  positive	  direction.	  Race	  also	  seemed	  to	  play	  a	  role	  with	  Caucasians	  sending	  
more	  than	  non-­‐Caucasians.	  In	  the	  second	  period,	  however,	  most	  of	  these	  effects	  
were	  washed	  away.	  Thus,	  we	  see	  that	  personality	  traits	  do	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  
trust	  game,	  but	  their	  impact	  is	  itself	  impacted	  significantly	  by	  history.	  
The	  Minimum	  Effort	  Game	  
We	  first	  produce	  summary	  statistics	  for	  effort	  choice,	  minimum	  effort,	  
maximum	  effort,	  and	  effort	  adjustment.	  These	  are	  first	  produced	  for	  the	  aggregate,	  
then	  broken	  down	  by	  first	  period,	  last	  period	  before	  re-­‐matching,	  first	  period	  after	  
re-­‐matching,	  and	  last	  period	  overall.	  They	  show	  an	  overall	  average	  effort	  of	  about	  4.	  
Further,	  they	  show	  that	  effort	  levels	  decreased	  over	  time,	  increased	  after	  the	  re-­‐
match,	  and	  then	  decreased	  again.	  This	  information	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  tables	  below,	  
followed	  by	  a	  graphical	  representation	  of	  effort	  levels	  by	  period.	  
Table	  5.3.1	  –	  Minimum	  Effort	  Overall	  Summary	  
	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	  
	  Effort	   3.9488	   2.0014	  
Min	  Effort	   2.9357	   1.8263	  
Median	   4	   -­‐	  
Max	  Effort	   5.0071	   1.7879	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Table	  5.3.2	  –	  Minimum	  Effort	  First	  Period	  Summary	  
	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	  
Effort	   4.4404	   1.8059	  
Min	  Effort	   3.0714	   1.4208	  
Max	  Effort	   5.7857	   1.3539	  
Median	   4	   -­‐	  
Effort	  Adjust	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.3.3	  –	  Minimum	  Effort	  Last	  Period	  Before	  Re-­‐Matching	  Summary	  
	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	  
Effort	   3.8571	   2.1740	  
Min	  Effort	   2.8928	   2.0359	  
Max	  Effort	   4.8928	   1.9636	  
Median	   4	   -­‐	  
Effort	  Adjust	   -­‐0.1071	   1.8433	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.3.4	  –	  Minimum	  Effort	  First	  Period	  After	  Re-­‐Matching	  Summary	  
	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	  
Effort	   4.4881	   1.8852	  
Min	  Effort	   2.8214	   1.4982	  
Max	  Effort	   5.9285	   1.1697	  
Median	   5	   -­‐	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Mean Effort by Period
Table	  5.3.5	  –	  Minimum	  Effort	  Last	  Period	  Summary	  
	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	  
Effort	   3.5000	   2.2628	  
Min	  Effort	   2.5714	   2.0375	  
Max	  Effort	   4.5714	   2.3039	  
Median	   3	   -­‐	  
Effort	  Adjust	   0.0357	   1.3660	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The	  most	  important	  variable	  to	  explain	  in	  the	  minimum	  effort	  game	  is	  the	  
chosen	  effort	  level.	  In	  the	  first	  model,	  we	  see	  notable	  magnitudes	  from	  openness	  (-­‐
0.499)	  and	  conscientiousness	  (-­‐0.349).	  However,	  this	  model	  has	  an	  r-­‐squared	  of	  
only	  0.03,	  meaning	  it	  explains	  very	  little	  variation	  in	  the	  data.	  This	  holds	  after	  
adding	  religiosity	  and	  demographics,	  with	  the	  only	  caveat	  of	  being	  male	  increasing	  
effort	  by	  0.396	  (though	  this	  result	  is	  insignificant).	  	  However,	  when	  we	  predict	  effort	  
with	  the	  historical	  variables	  of	  previous	  effort	  chosen	  and	  the	  within	  group	  
minimum	  effort	  from	  the	  previous	  round	  our	  r-­‐squared	  jumps	  to	  0.509.	  The	  
previous	  effort	  choice	  has	  a	  magnitude	  of	  0.336,	  and	  the	  previous	  minimum	  has	  a	  
magnitude	  of	  0.519,	  implying	  that	  a	  one	  point	  rise	  in	  the	  previous	  within	  group	  
minimum	  effort	  choice	  raises	  the	  next	  effort	  choice	  by	  0.519,	  all	  else	  constant.	  
Curiously,	  with	  one	  or	  two	  exceptions,	  estimates	  for	  variables	  in	  all	  other	  
specifications	  are	  negative,	  with	  large	  constants.	  These	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	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Table	  5.3.6	  –	  Effort	  Choices	  Overall	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Effort	  (N=800)	  
	   Model	  25	   Model	  26	   Model	  27	   Model	  28	   Model	  29	   Model	  30	  
Openness	   -­‐0.499	   -­‐0.486	   	   -­‐0.526	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.38)	   (0.35)	   	   (0.36)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consc	   -­‐0.349	   -­‐0.355	   	   -­‐0.271	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.29)	   (0.30)	   	   (0.31)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Extravert	   -­‐0.095	   -­‐0.102	   	   -­‐0.185	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.29)	   (0.28)	   	   (0.28)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Agreeable	   -­‐0.038	   -­‐0.047	   	   0.029	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.33)	   (0.35)	   	   (0.36)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.243	   -­‐0.248	   	   -­‐0.186	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.27)	   (0.29)	   	   (0.32)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Religious	   	   0.017	   	   0.033	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   (0.17)	   	   (0.18)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Age	   	   	   0.004	   -­‐0.028	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.09)	   (0.10)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
White	   	   	   -­‐0.079	   -­‐0.019	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.45)	   (0.49)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Male	   	   	   0.396	   0.389	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.32)	   (0.37)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pre	  Effort	   	   	   	   	   0.336***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.05)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pre	  Effort	  Min	   	   	   	   	   0.519***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.05)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   	   0.211	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.67)	  	  	  	  
Constant	   8.257***	   8.239***	   3.374***	   7.388***	   1.025***	   3.633***	  
	   (2.42)	   (2.37)	   (0.82)	   (2.70)	   (0.14)	   (1.02)	  	  	  	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.030	   0.030	   0.009	   0.038	   0.509	   0.000	  
*	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
Next,	  we	  conduct	  the	  same	  analysis,	  but	  isolate	  the	  results	  from	  the	  first	  
round	  of	  play.	  Chow	  tests	  showed	  that	  analysis	  by	  period	  was	  warranted	  for	  
personality	  plus	  religiosity	  and	  risk	  aversion,	  but	  not	  for	  personality,	  demographics	  
alone,	  or	  personality	  plus	  religiosity	  and	  demographics.	  This	  analysis	  reveals	  few	  
personality	  magnitudes	  of	  note.	  Most	  notable	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  openness,	  which	  has	  a	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magnitude	  of	  -­‐0.690	  in	  the	  model	  with	  personality	  and	  demographics,	  though	  this	  
result	  is	  insignificant.	  The	  most	  pronounced	  effect	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  of	  being	  male.	  
This	  magnitude	  hovers	  around	  0.89	  and	  is	  significant	  at	  he	  0.05	  and	  0.1	  levels	  in	  the	  
demographic	  and	  demographic	  plus	  traits	  models,	  respectively.	  This	  implies	  that	  
being	  male	  suggests	  about	  a	  0.89	  larger	  effort	  choice	  in	  the	  first	  round	  than	  being	  
female.	  A	  final	  estimate	  of	  note	  is	  risk	  aversion	  which	  has	  a	  magnitude	  of	  1.247,	  
implying	  that	  a	  shift	  most	  risk	  averse	  to	  least	  risk	  averse	  raises	  effort	  choice	  by	  
1.247.	  However,	  this	  result	  is	  insignificant.	  This	  suggests	  that	  being	  less	  risk	  averse	  
positively	  predicts	  effort	  levels	  in	  the	  first	  round,	  but	  that	  this	  effect	  shows	  volatility	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Table	  5.3.7	  –	  Effort	  Choices	  First	  Round	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Effort	  (First	  Round)	  (N=80)	  
	   Model	  31	   Model	  32	   Model	  33	   Model	  34	   Model	  35	  
Openness	   -­‐0.404	   -­‐0.654	   	   -­‐0.690	   	  
	   (0.47)	   (0.48)	   	   (0.44)	   	  
Consc	   -­‐0.474	   -­‐0.342	   	   -­‐0.090	   	  
	   (0.39)	   (0.40)	   	   (0.42)	   	  
Extravert	   0.089	   0.214	   	   -­‐0.072	   	  
	   (0.39)	   (0.36)	   	   (0.38)	   	  
Agreeable	   0.040	   0.211	   	   0.410	   	  
	   (0.37)	   (0.39)	   	   (0.36)	   	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.248	   -­‐0.147	   	   -­‐0.097	   	  
	   (0.35)	   (0.35)	   	   (0.38)	   	  
Religious	   	   -­‐0.330	   	   -­‐0.291	   	  
	   	   (0.20)	   	   (0.20)	   	  
Age	   	   	   0.016	   0.004	   	  
	   	   	   (0.09)	   (0.10)	   	  
White	   	   	   0.379	   0.455	   	  
	   	   	   (0.54)	   (0.58)	   	  
Male	   	   	   0.886**	   0.903*	   	  
	   	   	   (0.40)	   (0.52)	   	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   1.247	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.94)	  
Constant	   7.884***	   8.232***	   2.666***	   5.635*	   2.574*	  
	   (2.74)	   (2.62)	   (0.91)	   (3.18)	   (1.45)	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.036	   0.063	   0.072	   0.122	   0.019	  
*	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
Next,	  we	  conduct	  the	  same	  analysis	  on	  the	  first	  round	  after	  subjects	  have	  
been	  re-­‐matched.	  Chow	  tests	  showed	  that	  analysis	  by	  period	  was	  warranted	  for	  all	  
of	  the	  tested	  models.	  Here,	  we	  find	  no	  effects	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  from	  
personality	  traits,	  religiosity,	  demographics,	  or	  risk	  aversion.	  There	  are	  notable	  
negative	  effects	  from	  conscientiousness	  (approx..	  -­‐0.5)	  and	  neuroticism	  (approx.	  -­‐
0.45),	  though	  these	  are	  also	  insignificant.	  The	  effect	  from	  previous	  effort	  chosen	  and	  
previous	  minimum	  is	  significantly	  positive	  at	  the	  0.1	  level,	  but	  is	  much	  smaller	  in	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magnitude	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  overall	  results.	  The	  effect	  of	  risk	  aversion	  maintains	  
its	  relative	  magnitude	  and	  volatility.	  This	  suggests	  that	  participants	  do	  re-­‐strategize	  
in	  some	  fashion	  after	  they	  have	  been	  re-­‐matched,	  though	  we	  cannot	  comment	  on	  
whether	  or	  not	  this	  strategy	  is	  anything	  other	  than	  an	  arbitrary	  effort	  selection.	  
These	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  
Table	  5.3.8	  –	  Effort	  Choices	  in	  First	  Round	  after	  Re-­‐Matching	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Effort	  (First	  Round	  after	  Re-­‐matching)	  (N=80)	  
	   Model	  36	   Model	  37	   Model	  38	   Model	  39	   Model	  40	   Model	  41	  
Openness	   -­‐0.074	   -­‐0.058	   	   -­‐0.009	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.48)	   (0.47)	   	   (0.47)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consc	   -­‐0.601	   -­‐0.609	   	   -­‐0.492	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.40)	   (0.42)	   	   (0.45)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Extravert	   0.016	   0.008	   	   -­‐0.300	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.40)	   (0.41)	   	   (0.43)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Agreeable	   -­‐0.047	   -­‐0.058	   	   -­‐0.013	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.42)	   (0.47)	   	   (0.44)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.409	   -­‐0.416	   	   -­‐0.493	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.38)	   (0.40)	   	   (0.42)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Religious	   	   0.021	   	   0.041	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   (0.23)	   	   (0.23)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Age	   	   	   -­‐0.004	   -­‐0.019	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.10)	   (0.10)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
White	   	   	   0.546	   0.789	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.55)	   (0.56)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Male	   	   	   0.624	   0.421	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.42)	   (0.52)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pre	  Effort	   	   	   	   	   0.234**	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.09)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pre	  Effort	  Min	   	   	   	   	   0.244**	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.11)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   	   0.724	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.85)	  	  	  	  
Constant	   8.191**	   8.168**	   3.079***	   7.401**	   2.969***	   3.404**	  	  
	   (3.21)	   (3.16)	   (0.95)	   (3.54)	   (0.46)	   (1.30)	  	  	  	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.044	   0.044	   0.047	   0.084	   0.152	   0.006	  
*	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	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   Next,	  we	  look	  to	  see	  if	  we	  can	  explain	  coordination	  within	  group,	  where	  
coordination	  is	  defined	  as	  whether	  or	  not	  members	  in	  a	  group	  converge	  to	  the	  same	  
effort	  levels.	  To	  explore	  this,	  we	  construct	  a	  variable	  that	  measures	  the	  standard	  
deviation	  of	  effort	  levels	  chosen	  within	  groups.	  We	  then	  make	  this	  the	  dependent	  
variable	  in	  regressions,	  using	  the	  same	  independent	  variables	  as	  before.	  	  
	   Personality	  traits,	  religiosity,	  demographics,	  and	  risk	  aversion	  once	  again	  
have	  a	  difficult	  time	  explaining	  much	  as	  no	  parameter	  in	  any	  model	  differs	  
significantly	  from	  zero.	  Further,	  the	  magnitudes	  of	  all	  of	  these	  parameters	  remain	  
quite	  small,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  risk	  aversion,	  for	  which	  a	  shift	  from	  most	  risk	  
averse	  to	  least	  risk	  averse	  decreases	  coordination	  by	  0.245.	  This	  effect	  too,	  however,	  
maintains	  the	  previously	  seen	  volatility	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  risk	  aversion	  as	  it	  has	  a	  large	  
standard	  error.	  When	  previous	  effort	  chosen	  appears	  to	  have	  little	  to	  no	  effect	  on	  
coordination.	  The	  only	  variable	  that	  significantly	  affects	  coordination	  is	  the	  
minimum	  effort	  for	  a	  group	  in	  the	  previous	  round,	  which	  has	  a	  magnitude	  of	  -­‐0.189.	  
This	  implies	  a	  one	  point	  rise	  in	  the	  previous	  minimum	  effort	  decreases	  the	  within	  
group	  standard	  deviation	  (increases	  coordination)	  by	  0.189.	  No	  r-­‐squared	  is	  greater	  
than	  0.051,	  meaning	  even	  our	  best	  model	  can	  only	  explain	  about	  5%	  of	  the	  variation	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Table	  5.3.9	  -­‐	  Coordination	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Within	  Group	  Standard	  Deviation	  (N=800)	  
	   Model	  42	   Model	  43	   Model	  44	   Model	  45	   Model	  46	   Model	  47	  
Openness	   -­‐0.090	   -­‐0.053	   	   -­‐0.076	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.16)	   (0.15)	   	   (0.16)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consc	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.020	   	   -­‐0.025	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   	   (0.13)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Extravert	   0.022	   0.004	   	   0.077	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.11)	   (0.11)	   	   (0.11)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Agreeable	   0.013	   -­‐0.012	   	   0.003	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.15)	   (0.16)	   	   (0.17)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.072	   -­‐0.087	   	   -­‐0.052	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   	   (0.13)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Religious	   	   0.049	   	   0.047	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   (0.07)	   	   (0.07)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Age	   	   	   0.005	   0.011	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.04)	   (0.05)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
White	   	   	   -­‐0.197	   -­‐0.225	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.16)	   (0.18)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Male	   	   	   -­‐0.013	   -­‐0.024	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pre	  Effort	   	   	   	   	   0.060*	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.03)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pre	  Effort	  Min	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.189***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.04)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   	   0.245	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.28)	  	  	  	  
Constant	   1.960*	   1.909*	   1.729***	   1.783	   1.832***	   1.206***	  
	   (1.05)	   (1.01)	   (0.32)	   (1.14)	   (0.15)	   (0.42)	  	  	  	  
R-­‐Sqr	   0.002	   0.003	   0.005	   0.009	   0.051	   0.002	  
*	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	   	  
Next,	  we	  investigate	  how	  effort	  levels	  are	  adjusted	  in	  reaction	  to	  learning	  
about	  the	  efforts	  chosen.	  Specifically,	  first	  we	  set	  effort	  change	  as	  the	  dependent	  
variable	  while	  isolating	  results	  from	  subjects	  finding	  out	  that	  their	  effort	  was	  the	  
minimum	  effort	  in	  their	  group,	  and	  then	  redo	  the	  analysis	  for	  the	  converse.	  
	   When	  subjects	  are	  the	  minimum,	  we	  find	  that	  personality,	  religiosity,	  and	  
demographics	  cannot	  predict	  effort	  adjustment	  in	  that	  no	  r-­‐squared	  exceeds	  0.011.	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Further,	  no	  effects	  differ	  significantly	  from	  0.	  The	  only	  magnitude	  of	  some	  note	  is	  
that	  of	  neuroticism	  (approx..	  0.14),	  which	  tends	  to	  raise	  effort	  levels	  slightly	  when	  
subjects	  find	  out	  they	  are	  the	  minimum	  We	  find	  a	  small	  but	  positive	  effect	  from	  the	  
previous	  minimum,	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level,	  though	  this	  is	  not	  particularly	  
enlightening.	  Risk	  aversion	  shows	  a	  large	  negative,	  but	  insignificant,	  effect	  (-­‐0.582)	  
with	  the	  same	  large	  standard	  error	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  previous	  results.	  Overall,	  none	  
of	  the	  models	  explored	  have	  much	  explanatory	  power.	  Chow	  tests	  were	  cleared	  for	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Table	  5.3.10	  –	  Reaction	  to	  Being	  Minimum	  	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Effort	  Adjustment	  (If	  Minimum)	  (N=402)	  
	   Model	  48	   Model	  49	   Model	  50	   Model	  51	   Model	  52	   Model	  53	  
Openness	   0.131	   0.101	   	   0.058	   	   	  
	   (0.25)	   (0.25)	   	   (0.24)	   	   	  
Consc	   0.064	   0.072	   	   0.079	   	   	  
	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	   	   (0.15)	   	   	  
Extravert	   -­‐0.124	   -­‐0.112	   	   -­‐0.035	   	   	  
	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	   	   (0.14)	   	   	  
Agreeable	   0.019	   0.031	   	   0.063	   	   	  
	   (0.18)	   (0.18)	   	   (0.20)	   	   	  
Neurotic	   0.114	   0.124	   	   0.168	   	   	  
	   (0.13)	   (0.14)	   	   (0.15)	   	   	  
Religious	   	   -­‐0.029	   	   -­‐0.039	   	   	  
	   	   (0.07)	   	   (0.07)	   	   	  
Age	   	   	   0.034	   0.032	   	   	  
	   	   	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   	   	  
White	   	   	   -­‐0.135	   -­‐0.175	   	   	  
	   	   	   (0.18)	   (0.19)	   	   	  
Male	   	   	   -­‐0.084	   0.018	   	   	  
	   	   	   (0.17)	   (0.21)	   	   	  
Pre	  Effort	  Min	   	   	   	   	   0.141***	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.03)	   	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.582	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.49)	  
Constant	   -­‐1.323	   -­‐1.248	   -­‐0.577*	   -­‐1.600	   -­‐1.114***	   0.192	  
	   (1.21)	   (1.22)	   (0.35)	   (1.58)	   (0.15)	   (0.72)	  
R-­‐sqr	   0.007	   0.007	   0.005	   0.011	   0.031	   0.005	  
*	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
	   Looking	  at	  reactions	  to	  not	  being	  the	  minimum,	  we	  found	  that	  agreeableness	  
has	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  effort	  level	  adjustments.	  That	  is,	  a	  one	  unit	  
increase	  in	  agreeableness	  leads	  to	  a	  roughly	  -­‐0.4	  revision	  in	  effort	  levels	  when	  
another	  member	  of	  their	  group	  was	  the	  minimum.	  This	  effect	  was	  greatest	  when	  
including	  the	  Big	  Five	  and	  religiosity.	  Aside	  from	  this,	  the	  only	  other	  notable	  result	  
was	  that	  risk	  aversion	  maintains	  its	  volatile	  effect	  on	  decision	  making.	  No	  other	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effects	  differ	  significantly	  from	  zero.	  These	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  table	  
below.	  
Table	  5.3.11	  –	  Reaction	  to	  Not	  Being	  Minimum	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Effort	  Adjustment	  (If	  Not	  Minimum)	  (N=318)	  
	   Model	  54	   Model	  55	   Model	  56	   Model	  57	   Model	  58	   Model	  59	  
Openness	   -­‐0.105	   -­‐0.073	   	   -­‐0.113	   	   	  
	   (0.20)	   (0.20)	   	   (0.21)	   	   	  
Consc	   0.183	   0.143	   	   0.153	   	   	  
	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   	   (0.14)	   	   	  
Extravert	   0.095	   0.074	   	   -­‐0.005	   	   	  
	   (0.13)	   (0.12)	   	   (0.14)	   	   	  
Agreeable	   -­‐0.357**	   -­‐0.412***	   	   -­‐0.412**	   	   	  
	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	   	   (0.16)	   	   	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.050	   -­‐0.074	   	   -­‐0.069	   	   	  
	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   	   (0.13)	   	   	  
Religious	   	   0.077	   	   0.089	   	   	  
	   	   (0.08)	   	   (0.08)	   	   	  
Age	   	   	   -­‐0.014	   -­‐0.031	   	   	  
	   	   	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	   	   	  
White	   	   	   0.118	   0.116	   	   	  
	   	   	   (0.18)	   (0.19)	   	   	  
Male	   	   	   0.189	   0.202	   	   	  
	   	   	   (0.16)	   (0.16)	   	   	  
Pre	  Effort	  Min	   	   	   	   	   0.011	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.05)	   	  
Risk	  Aversion	   	   	   	   	   	   0.319	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.36)	  
Constant	   1.469	   1.555	   0.314	   1.612	   0.575***	   0.130	  
	   (0.99)	   (0.98)	   (0.27)	   (1.24)	   (0.17)	   (0.52)	  
R-­‐sqr	   0.014	   0.016	   0.005	   0.022	   0.000	   0.002	  	  
*	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
	   We	  explore	  two	  final	  models	  to	  explain	  effort	  levels	  in	  which	  we	  incorporate	  
fixed	  effects	  from	  groups.	  These	  models	  show	  no	  effect	  from	  personality	  traits,	  but	  
find	  a	  small	  positive	  effect	  from	  the	  minimum	  in	  the	  previous	  round,	  significant	  at	  
the	  0.01	  level.	  Most	  notably,	  our	  r-­‐squared	  values	  are	  much	  higher,	  meaning	  fixed	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group	  effects	  account	  for	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  variation.	  These	  results	  are	  
summarized	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  
Table	  5.3.12	  –	  Effort	  Choices	  with	  Fixed	  Group	  Effects	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Effort	  (N=800)	  
	   Model	  60	   Model	  61	  
Openness	   -­‐0.156	   -­‐0.162	  
	   (0.14)	   (0.13)	  
Consc	   -­‐0.140	   -­‐0.117	  
	   (0.13)	   (0.11)	  
Extravert	   -­‐0.108	   -­‐0.111	  
	   (0.15)	   (0.15)	  
Agreeable	   0.137	   0.127	  
	   (0.10)	   (0.09)	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.129	   -­‐0.137	  
	   (0.12)	   (0.11)	  
Previous	  Min	   	   0.284***	  
	   	   (0.08)	  
Constant	   7.136***	   5.766***	  
	   (0.84)	   (0.90)	  
R-­‐sqr	   0.523	   0.574	  
	  	  *	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
	   In	  summary,	  we	  find	  the	  best	  predictors	  of	  behavior	  in	  the	  minimum	  effort	  
game	  are	  the	  previous	  effort	  chosen	  by	  the	  subject,	  the	  minimum	  effort	  of	  the	  group,	  
and	  fixed	  group	  effects.	  We	  find	  that	  personality,	  demographics,	  religiosity	  play	  a	  
relatively	  minor	  role	  in	  determining	  effort	  level	  selections.	  When	  we	  looked	  at	  the	  
first	  period	  to	  eliminate	  the	  effects	  of	  history,	  we	  found	  that	  notable	  effects	  
openness,	  agreeableness,	  gender,	  and	  risk	  aversion,	  though	  only	  gender	  achieves	  
significance.	  After	  re-­‐matching,	  we	  saw	  notable	  effects	  from	  conscientiousness,	  
neuroticism,	  and	  gender,	  but	  none	  of	  these	  achieve	  significance.	  Indeed	  the	  only	  
variables	  that	  are	  consistent	  predictors	  are	  historical	  parameters.	  We	  also	  saw	  that	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while	  re-­‐matching	  does	  appear	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  re-­‐assessment	  of	  strategy,	  this	  re-­‐
assessment	  may	  be	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  randomization.	  We	  found	  little	  evidence	  of	  
any	  tested	  parameter’s	  influence	  on	  coordination,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  previous	  
minimum,	  though	  even	  this	  effect	  is	  small.	  One	  area	  where	  personality	  traits	  make	  a	  
clear	  impact	  is	  with	  agreeableness,	  which	  appears	  to	  lead	  to	  significant	  downward	  
effort	  level	  revisions	  when	  a	  subject	  finds	  out	  they	  were	  not	  the	  minimum	  effort.	  	  
The	  Cheap	  Talk	  Game	  
In	  this	  game,	  the	  truth	  was	  told	  61%	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  the	  message	  was	  
believed	  60%	  of	  the	  time.	  In	  instances	  where	  the	  sender	  lied,	  the	  receiver	  believed	  
the	  lie	  62.5%	  of	  the	  time.	  These	  results	  are	  presented	  graphically	  below.	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First,	  we	  sought	  to	  explain	  truth	  telling	  behavior.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  
influence	  from	  the	  Big	  Five,	  religiosity,	  contextual	  variables,	  or	  risk	  aversion	  with	  
truth	  telling	  behavior.	  By	  contextual	  variable,	  we	  mean	  the	  incentives	  there	  were	  to	  
lie,	  which	  emerged	  from	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  prizes.	  The	  only	  small	  exception	  was	  
that	  extraversion	  has	  a	  magnitude	  of	  -­‐0.099,	  meaning	  a	  one	  unit	  rise	  in	  extraversion	  
leads	  to	  about	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  the	  likelihood	  of	  truth	  telling	  when	  demographics	  
are	  controlled	  for.	  This	  result	  was	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  Race	  also	  played	  a	  
significant	  role	  in	  that	  Caucasians	  were	  about	  11%	  more	  likely	  to	  tell	  the	  truth.	  	  
The	  greatest	  impact	  appears	  to	  be	  from	  history.	  We	  constructed	  a	  variable	  
that	  measured	  the	  percentage	  of	  times	  a	  participant	  was	  lied	  to	  over	  the	  course	  of	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to	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  truth	  telling	  by	  about	  24%.	  These	  results	  are	  
summarized	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  
Table	  5.4.1	  –	  Truth	  Telling	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Truth	  Told	  (N=640)	  
	   Model	  62	   Model	  63	   Model	  64	   Model	  65	   Model	  66	   Model	  67	  
Openness	   -­‐0.006	   0.029	   	   0.033	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.07)	   (0.08)	   	   (0.07)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consc	   -­‐0.051	   -­‐0.069	   	   -­‐0.044	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   	   (0.05)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Extravert	   -­‐0.030	   -­‐0.048	   	   -­‐0.099**	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   	   (0.05)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Agreeable	   0.061	   0.037	   	   0.049	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   	   (0.04)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Neurotic	   0.061	   0.047	   	   0.041	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   	   (0.05)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Religious	   	   0.047*	   	   0.052**	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.02)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Age	   	   	   0.001	   -­‐0.004	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
White	   	   	   0.114*	   0.111*	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.06)	   (0.06)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Male	   	   	   0.034	   0.095	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.06)	   (0.06)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lied	  To	   	   	   	   	   0.237***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.07)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Incentive	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.002**	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.00)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.056	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.12)	  	  	  	  
Constant	   0.555*	   0.507	   0.461***	   0.309	   0.597***	   0.694***	  
	   (0.33)	   (0.33)	   (0.12)	   (0.36)	   (0.06)	   (0.19)	  	  	  	  
R-­‐sqr	   0.019	   0.027	   0.011	   0.045	   0.030	   0.001	  	  
	  	  	  *	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
We	  use	  the	  same	  models	  to	  predict	  whether	  or	  not	  participants	  were	  more	  
likely	  to	  believe	  the	  message,	  though	  we	  exclude	  incentives	  since	  receivers	  are	  not	  
aware	  of	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  prizes.	  As	  such,	  this	  information	  cannot	  influence	  
their	  decision	  making.	  Analysis	  reveals	  little	  to	  no	  impact	  from	  personality	  traits,	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religiosity,	  or	  risk	  aversion.	  In	  the	  model	  that	  looks	  only	  at	  demographics,	  females	  
are	  about	  10%	  less	  likely	  to	  believe	  the	  message.	  The	  strongest	  predictor	  of	  
behavior	  was,	  again,	  how	  often	  a	  subject	  was	  lied	  to.	  This	  relationship	  had	  a	  
magnitude	  of	  -­‐0.190,	  implying	  an	  additional	  instance	  of	  being	  lied	  to	  reduces	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  believing	  the	  message	  by	  19%.	  This	  result	  was	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  
level.	  Risk	  aversion	  also	  has	  a	  magnitude	  of	  note	  (-­‐0.147),	  though	  this	  result	  is	  
insignificant.	  These	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  
Table	  5.4.2	  –	  Message	  Believing	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Message	  Believed	  (N=640)	  
	   Model	  68	   Model	  69	   Model	  70	   Model	  71	   Model	  72	   Model	  73	  
Openness	   0.054	   0.060	   	   0.078	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.07)	   (0.07)	   	   (0.07)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consc	   0.023	   0.019	   	   -­‐0.010	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.05)	   	   (0.05)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Extravert	   -­‐0.050	   -­‐0.054	   	   -­‐0.055	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.05)	   	   (0.06)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Agreeable	   0.047	   0.043	   	   0.011	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   	   (0.06)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Neurotic	   -­‐0.005	   -­‐0.008	   	   -­‐0.035	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   	   (0.05)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Religious	   	   0.009	   	   0.005	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Age	   	   	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.004	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
White	   	   	   0.027	   0.064	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.05)	   (0.07)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Male	   	   	   -­‐0.103**	   -­‐0.105*	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lied	  To	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.190**	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.09)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Risk	  Averse	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.147	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.12)	  	  	  	  
Constant	   0.324	   0.315	   0.758***	   0.695*	   0.672***	   0.820***	  
	   (0.36)	   (0.36)	   (0.10)	   (0.39)	   (0.04)	   (0.18)	  	  	  	  
R-­‐sqr	   0.009	   0.009	   0.012	   0.019	   0.013	   0.004	  
	  	  	  	  *p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	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Finally,	  we	  noticed	  that	  a	  significant	  cohort	  told	  the	  truth	  every	  time.	  This	  led	  
us	  to	  investigate	  if	  personality	  and	  religiosity	  were	  associated	  with	  those	  who	  told	  
the	  truth	  (Model	  75)	  or	  those	  who	  did	  not	  (Model	  74).	  Unfortunately,	  we	  found	  that	  
personality	  and	  religiosity	  was	  not	  associated	  with	  those	  who	  told	  the	  truth	  every	  
time,	  with	  no	  magnitude	  exceeding	  0.05.	  However,	  we	  found	  a	  significant	  positive	  
association	  between	  religiosity	  and	  truth	  telling	  amongst	  those	  who	  did	  not	  tell	  the	  
truth	  each	  time,	  though	  this	  effect	  was	  small	  in	  that	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  religiosity	  
increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  an	  individual	  who	  told	  the	  truth	  each	  time	  by	  4.4%.	  
These	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  
Table	  5.4.3	  –	  Truth	  Telling	  with	  Exclusions	  
Dep.	  Variable	  =	  Truth	  Told	  
	   Model	  74	  (N=172)	   Model	  75	  (N=542)	  
Openness	   -­‐0.009	   0.044	  	  	  	  
	   (0.08)	   (0.04)	  	  	  	  
Consc	   -­‐0.056	   -­‐0.040	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.03)	  	  	  	  
Extravert	   -­‐0.005	   -­‐0.022	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.02)	  	  	  	  
Agreeable	   0.045	   -­‐0.002	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.03)	  	  	  	  
Neurotic	   0.014	   0.024	  	  	  	  
	   (0.04)	   (0.03)	  	  	  	  
Religious	   0.009	   0.044***	  
	   (0.03)	   (0.01)	  	  	  	  
Constant	   0.573*	   0.752***	  
	   (0.31)	   (0.23)	  	  	  	  
R-­‐sqr	   0.006	   0.026	  
	  	  	  	  *p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01	  
	  
In	  summary,	  the	  behavior	  in	  the	  cheap	  talk	  game	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  
history,	  with	  little	  influence	  from	  personality,	  religiosity,	  or	  risk	  aversion.	  There	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does	  appear	  to	  be	  signs	  of	  an	  influence	  from	  gender	  as	  well,	  and	  perhaps	  some	  from	  
extraversion.	  Specifically,	  having	  been	  lied	  to	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  important	  
predictor	  of	  both	  truth	  telling	  and	  message	  believing,	  though	  even	  this	  effect	  was	  
quite	  small.
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CHAPTER	  SIX	  
DISCUSSION	  
	   In	  the	  final	  section,	  we	  combine	  the	  results	  from	  our	  experiment	  with	  
previously	  existing	  work	  to	  see	  how	  our	  work	  expands	  upon	  this,	  and	  what	  
guidance	  it	  has	  for	  future	  research	  on	  this	  topic.	  
Our	  results	  for	  the	  trust	  game	  showed	  some	  evidence	  of	  effects	  from	  some	  
personality	  traits,	  demographics,	  contexts	  and	  risk	  aversion,	  particularly	  from	  
agreeableness	  and	  neuroticism.	  These	  results	  presented	  themselves	  most	  clearly	  
after	  sorting	  by	  period.	  Some	  effects	  from	  personality	  that	  were	  present	  in	  the	  first	  
round	  tended	  to	  disappear	  in	  the	  second,	  with	  new	  effects	  emerging	  in	  the	  second,	  
though	  to	  a	  slightly	  lesser	  extent.	  In	  the	  minimum	  effort	  game,	  we	  again	  saw	  some	  
influence	  from	  personality	  traits	  and	  demographics,	  but	  the	  best	  predictors	  of	  
behavior	  were	  past	  behavior	  by	  the	  individual	  subject,	  the	  past	  behavior	  within	  the	  
group,	  and	  fixed	  group	  effects.	  We	  have	  similar	  findings	  regarding	  history	  in	  the	  
cheap	  talk	  game.	  Risk	  aversion,	  which	  was	  predicted	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  in	  all	  three	  
games,	  showed	  mixed	  magnitudes	  with	  few	  instances	  of	  significant	  effects.	  Thus,	  our	  
main	  conclusion	  from	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  while	  personality	  traits	  and	  other	  
characteristics	  do	  matter	  to	  some	  extent,	  most	  of	  this	  is	  quickly	  washed	  away	  once	  
history	  develops.	  	  
	   In	  the	  literature	  review,	  we	  saw	  that	  we	  chose	  our	  contextual	  variables	  based	  
on	  those	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  variation	  in	  behavior.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  
setting	  that	  we	  expected	  to	  find	  the	  greatest	  influence	  from	  personality	  traits.	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Hence,	  we	  already	  knew,	  and	  learned	  further	  from	  our	  experiment,	  that	  context	  is	  
critical	  in	  predicting	  behavior	  in	  these	  games.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  minimum	  effort	  
game,	  we	  know	  that	  when	  group	  size	  is	  below	  two,	  coordination	  happens	  at	  the	  
highest	  effort	  level	  quite	  often.	  When	  the	  group	  size	  is	  greater	  than	  3,	  we	  tend	  to	  see	  
convergence	  to	  the	  lowest	  effort	  level.	  Similar	  examples	  hold	  for	  contextual	  
variables	  in	  the	  trust	  game	  (the	  size	  of	  the	  multiplier,	  among	  others)	  and	  the	  cheap	  
talk	  game	  (the	  size	  of	  the	  prize,	  among	  others).	  	  
Our	  results,	  then,	  suggest	  several	  possibilities.	  One	  is	  that	  our	  data	  set	  simply	  
too	  small	  to	  properly	  evaluate	  the	  phenomenon	  we	  wished	  to	  explore.	  Indeed,	  we	  
did	  find	  reasonably	  sized	  magnitudes	  in	  many	  cases,	  with	  some	  significant	  effects.	  
Further,	  previous	  literature	  does	  suggest	  that	  personality	  traits	  do	  have	  a	  role	  to	  
play	  in	  explaining	  behavior	  in	  these	  games.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  either	  the	  
subjects	  did	  not	  fully	  understand	  the	  games,	  or	  that	  our	  conversion	  rate	  of	  
experiment	  dollars	  to	  real	  dollars	  was	  too	  small	  to	  elicit	  motivated	  behavior	  from	  
participants.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  we	  simply	  missed	  some	  important	  
variables	  in	  our	  analysis.	  We	  must	  also	  consider	  that	  the	  Big	  Five	  is	  one	  personality	  
trait	  theory	  amongst	  many,	  so	  it	  could	  very	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  different	  model	  
will	  deliver	  better	  results.	  
In	  terms	  of	  creating	  a	  coherent	  model	  for	  behavior,	  one	  possibility	  is	  that	  
economic	  parameters	  and	  trait	  theories	  are	  complementary	  and	  can	  bolster	  one	  
another’s	  explanations.	  This	  is	  an	  appealing	  conclusion,	  though	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  
that	  it	  is	  an	  incoherent	  story,	  in	  that	  it	  does	  have	  a	  coherent	  theory	  of	  the	  mind	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underpinning	  it.	  If	  profit	  maximization	  and	  personality	  trait	  theories	  are	  substitutes,	  
then	  this	  calls	  for	  a	  hearty	  debate	  between	  economists	  and	  personality	  
psychologists.	  	  
Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  economists	  have	  constructed	  models	  to	  explain	  
behavior	  in	  the	  settings	  they	  use	  to	  explore	  behavior,	  while	  psychologists	  have	  
constructed	  models	  for	  theirs.	  This	  is	  troubling	  because	  if	  academics	  are	  crafting	  
models	  that	  only	  work	  in	  contexts	  they	  have	  constructed,	  they	  may	  have	  nothing	  to	  
do	  reality	  at	  all	  and	  may	  simply	  be	  artifacts	  of	  the	  conditions	  those	  groups	  of	  
academics	  have	  respectively	  constructed.	  	  
A	  final	  potential	  conclusion	  could	  be	  that	  human	  behavior	  is	  highly	  adaptable	  
and	  very	  context-­‐specific.	  Indeed,	  perhaps	  the	  defining	  trait	  of	  humanity	  is	  the	  
variety	  of	  situations	  we	  encounter	  and	  thrive	  in.	  It	  could	  simply	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  
foundation	  of	  human	  behavior	  is	  that	  it	  is	  adaptable	  and	  changeable.	  This	  could	  
mean	  that	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  single	  model	  for	  human	  behavior	  is	  an	  insurmountable	  
task.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  study	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	  behavior	  is	  a	  
pointless	  one.	  In	  fact,	  what	  it	  really	  implies	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  huge	  sum	  of	  
research	  that	  evaluates	  the	  many	  different	  contexts	  and	  situations	  in	  which	  humans	  
interact.	  Indeed,	  if	  there	  is	  one	  thing	  this	  thesis	  suggests,	  it	  is	  that	  context	  and	  
history	  are	  crucial	  in	  determining	  behavior.	  	  
From	  a	  theoretical	  standpoint,	  our	  research	  suggests,	  first,	  that	  exploring	  
phenomena	  in	  repeated	  games	  will	  be	  dictated	  primarily	  by	  context	  and	  history.	  As	  
such,	  any	  future	  researcher	  would	  be	  well	  advised	  to	  place	  their	  focus	  on	  these	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variables	  for	  study.	  Further,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  
effects	  of	  personality	  should	  construct	  games	  that	  are	  either	  not	  repeated,	  change	  
their	  contextual	  variables	  often,	  or	  avoid	  the	  establishment	  of	  history.	  Practically,	  
our	  research	  suggests	  that	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  
personality	  and	  behavior	  in	  a	  setting	  should	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  environment	  and	  
history	  before	  seeking	  out	  the	  impact	  of	  personality	  traits.	  	  	  
Our	  research,	  then,	  is	  inconclusive.	  Even	  our	  broad	  approach	  captures	  a	  
miniscule	  sum	  of	  the	  possible	  contexts	  and	  forms	  of	  exploration	  required.	  An	  ideal	  
project	  with	  no	  limitations	  would	  study	  far	  more	  subjects	  from	  many	  different	  
geographical,	  historical,	  and	  demographical	  characteristics,	  under	  many	  more	  
contexts,	  with	  far	  more	  tools	  of	  evaluation.	  The	  duty	  for	  future	  research	  is	  clear.	  
	   	  




Hello,	  everyone.	  Thank	  you	  for	  coming.	  Please	  put	  your	  cell	  phones	  on	  silent	  and	  
please	  do	  not	  communicate	  with	  any	  fellow	  participants	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  
experiment.	  You	  should	  have	  completed	  an	  on-­‐line	  questionnaire	  prior	  to	  this	  
session.	  If	  you	  have	  not	  done	  so,	  please	  come	  see	  me	  once	  I	  finish	  reading	  the	  
instructions.	  
	  
Today	  you	  will	  be	  playing	  four	  different	  games.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment,	  you	  
will	  make	  decisions	  that	  will	  earn	  you	  experimental	  dollars,	  unless	  otherwise	  stated.	  
These	  experimental	  dollars	  will	  be	  converted	  to	  regular	  dollars	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
experiment	  at	  an	  exchange	  rate	  that	  varies	  from	  game	  to	  game,	  so	  more	  
experimental	  dollars	  means	  more	  real	  dollars.	  All	  decisions	  will	  be	  clearly	  explained	  
and	  your	  choices	  are	  yours	  alone	  to	  make.	  
	  
The	  experiment	  will	  be	  conducted	  on	  your	  computer	  terminals.	  You	  will	  play	  the	  
games	  by	  interacting	  with	  a	  series	  of	  prompts	  on	  the	  screen.	  The	  choices	  available	  to	  
you	  as	  well	  as	  results	  and	  payoffs	  will	  be	  displayed	  on	  the	  screen.	  Take	  particular	  
note	  of	  the	  upper	  right	  hand	  corner	  of	  the	  screen.	  Anytime	  the	  program	  requires	  an	  
action	  from	  you,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  clock	  in	  this	  location	  displaying	  how	  much	  time	  you	  
have	  left	  to	  act.	  	  
	  





In	  this	  game,	  you	  will	  be	  presented	  with	  a	  series	  of	  choices,	  from	  which	  you	  will	  
choose	  based	  on	  your	  preference.	  There	  will	  be	  two	  options,	  A	  and	  B.	  Option	  A	  will	  
present	  you	  with	  a	  gamble	  which	  will	  give	  you	  a	  certain	  probability	  of	  earning	  one	  
payoff	  and	  one	  minus	  that	  probability	  for	  earning	  an	  alternate	  payoff.	  Option	  B	  will	  
provide	  you	  with	  a	  similar	  gamble.	  You	  will	  then	  choose	  either	  option	  A	  or	  B	  
depending	  on	  which	  gamble	  you	  prefer.	  Once	  you	  make	  your	  choice,	  you	  will	  be	  
shown	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  gamble	  you	  selected	  and	  how	  much	  your	  payoff	  is	  
accordingly.	  You	  will	  then	  play	  the	  game	  again	  9	  more	  times.	  The	  values	  from	  the	  
payoffs	  will	  be	  converted	  into	  real	  dollars	  for	  one	  of	  the	  ten	  rounds.	  The	  decision	  
regarding	  which	  of	  the	  ten	  gambles	  is	  used	  for	  actual	  payoffs	  will	  be	  decided	  
randomly.	  This	  means	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  all	  ten	  rounds,	  we	  will	  randomly	  choose	  
one	  of	  the	  rounds	  to	  use	  for	  your	  actual	  payment.	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Let’s	  look	  at	  an	  example.	  Suppose	  you	  begin	  the	  game	  and	  you	  are	  presented	  with	  
two	  options.	  Option	  A	  says	  there	  is	  a	  40%	  of	  earning	  $2.00	  and	  a	  60%	  chance	  of	  
earning	  $1.60.	  Option	  B	  says	  there	  is	  a	  40%	  chance	  of	  earning	  $3.85	  and	  a	  60%	  
chance	  of	  earning	  $0.10.	  It	  is	  now	  up	  to	  you	  to	  decide	  which	  of	  these	  gambles	  you	  
prefer.	  Suppose	  you	  choose	  option	  B.	  If	  you	  win	  the	  gamble,	  you	  would	  earn	  $3.85.	  If	  
you	  lose	  the	  gamble,	  you	  earn	  only	  $0.10.	  	  
	  
As	  you	  play	  the	  game,	  the	  values	  of	  the	  probabilities	  will	  change,	  but	  the	  payoffs	  will	  
remain	  the	  same.	  That	  is,	  while	  the	  amount	  you	  can	  earn	  from	  each	  gamble	  stays	  the	  
same,	  the	  chances	  of	  you	  winning	  and	  losing	  a	  gamble	  will	  change.	  This	  may	  change	  
whether	  you	  prefer	  option	  A	  or	  B,	  so	  keep	  a	  close	  watch	  on	  those	  probabilities!	  
	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  questions,	  you	  may	  ask	  them	  now.	  
	  

















In	  this	  game,	  you	  will	  be	  matched	  anonymously	  with	  a	  partner.	  You	  will	  be	  
randomly	  assigned	  the	  role	  of	  either	  first-­‐mover	  or	  second-­‐mover.	  The	  first	  mover	  
will	  receive	  10	  experimental	  dollars.	  The	  first-­‐mover	  must	  then	  decide	  what,	  if	  any,	  
portion	  to	  send	  to	  the	  second-­‐mover.	  The	  amount	  the	  first-­‐mover	  sends	  will	  be	  
doubled.	  The	  second-­‐mover	  must	  then	  make	  a	  similar	  decision	  and	  choose	  what,	  if	  
any,	  portion	  of	  the	  received	  amount	  he	  sends	  back	  to	  the	  first-­‐mover.	  However,	  the	  
amount	  the	  second-­‐mover	  sends	  is	  not	  altered	  .The	  game	  ends	  after	  the	  second-­‐
mover	  makes	  his/her	  decision,	  or	  if	  the	  first-­‐mover	  decides	  to	  send	  nothing.	  You	  
will	  play	  this	  game	  two	  times,	  in	  all.	  
	  
Let’s	  look	  at	  an	  example.	  Feel	  free	  to	  follow	  along	  on	  the	  flowchart	  below.	  Assume	  
the	  first-­‐mover	  receives	  10	  EDs.	  He	  decides	  to	  send	  8	  EDs	  to	  the	  second	  mover.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  
A:	  40%	  of	  $2.00	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  60%	  of	  $1.60	  	  	  
	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  
B:	  40%	  of	  $3.85	  
	  	  	  	  	  60%	  of	  $0.10	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Hence,	  the	  first-­‐mover	  has	  kept	  2	  EDs.	  The	  8	  EDs	  send	  by	  the	  first-­‐mover	  is	  doubled	  
so	  that	  the	  second-­‐mover	  receives	  16	  EDs.	  The	  second	  mover	  then	  has	  16	  EUs,	  of	  
which	  he	  can	  keep	  all	  16,	  none,	  or	  any	  integer	  amount	  in-­‐between.	  Suppose	  he	  
decides	  to	  send	  back	  5	  EDs.	  Then	  the	  second-­‐mover	  walks	  away	  with	  the	  16	  EDs	  he	  
received	  minus	  the	  5	  that	  he	  sent	  back,	  which	  equals	  11	  earned	  EDs.	  The	  first	  mover	  
has	  the	  2	  that	  he	  did	  not	  send,	  plus	  5	  more	  that	  was	  sent	  back,	  making	  7	  earned	  EDs.	  	  
At	  this	  point,	  the	  game	  ends.	  
	  
The	  exchange	  rate	  for	  this	  experiment	  is	  0.25,	  so	  each	  ED	  is	  worth	  0.25	  real	  dollars.	  






In	  this	  game	  you	  will	  be	  matched	  anonymously	  with	  two	  people	  to	  form	  groups	  of	  
three.	  Each	  of	  you	  will	  then	  choose	  an	  E	  that	  ranges	  from	  1	  through	  7.	  The	  payoff	  in	  
this	  game	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  E	  you	  choose	  personally	  and	  the	  lowest	  chosen	  E	  of	  the	  
group.	  Specifically,	  your	  payoff	  will	  equal	  50	  plus	  20	  times	  the	  lowest	  E	  chosen	  in	  
the	  group	  minus	  10	  times	  the	  E	  you	  chose	  personally.	  This	  payoff	  function	  is	  shown	  
at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  page.	  
	  
Let’s	  look	  at	  an	  example.	  Suppose	  you	  choose	  an	  E	  of	  3,	  and	  your	  group	  members	  
select	  E’s	  of	  2	  and	  7,	  respectively.	  Thus,	  the	  lowest	  E	  of	  the	  group	  is	  2.	  In	  this	  case,	  
your	  payoff	  will	  be	  50	  plus	  20	  times	  the	  lowest,	  which	  is	  2,	  so	  40,	  minus	  10	  times	  3,	  
which	  was	  your	  own	  E,	  so	  30.	  So	  you	  would	  earn	  50	  +	  20*2	  –	  10*3	  =	  50	  +	  40	  –	  30	  =	  
60	  experiment	  dollars.	  The	  group	  member	  who	  chose	  an	  E	  of	  2	  would	  earn	  50	  +20*2	  
–	  10*2	  =	  50	  +	  40	  –	  20	  =	  50	  experiment	  dollars.	  The	  group	  member	  who	  chose	  an	  E	  of	  
7	  would	  earn	  50	  +	  2*20	  –	  10*7	  =	  50	  +	  40	  –	  70	  =	  20	  experimental	  dollars.	  
	  
Let’s	  look	  at	  one	  more	  example.	  Assume	  you	  choose	  an	  E	  of	  5,	  and	  your	  group	  
members	  choose	  Es	  of	  6	  and	  7,	  respectively.	  In	  this	  case,	  your	  own	  payoff	  would	  be	  
50	  +	  20*5	  –	  10*5	  =	  50	  +	  100	  –	  50	  =	  100	  EDs.	  The	  team	  member	  who	  chose	  an	  E	  of	  6	  
would	  earn	  50	  +	  20*5	  –	  10*6	  =	  50	  +	  100	  –	  60	  =	  90	  EDs.	  The	  member	  who	  chose	  7	  
	   74	  
would	  earn	  50	  +	  20*5	  –	  10*7	  =	  50	  +	  100	  –	  70	  =	  80	  EDs.	  	  
	  
As	  you	  can	  see,	  your	  payoff	  increases	  as	  the	  minimum	  of	  the	  group	  increases,	  and	  
also	  when	  your	  own	  E	  decreases.	  
	  
Once	  every	  member	  of	  your	  group	  has	  chosen	  an	  E	  the	  game	  ends.	  You	  will	  be	  
shown	  your	  payoff	  and	  the	  game	  will	  start	  again.	  You	  will	  then	  play	  the	  game	  again	  
with	  the	  same	  group.	  After	  you	  have	  played	  the	  game	  5	  times,	  you	  will	  be	  re-­‐
matched	  to	  form	  a	  new	  group	  of	  3	  and	  play	  the	  game	  5	  more	  times.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  next	  page	  provides	  a	  table	  that	  you	  can	  use	  to	  easily	  see	  what	  your	  payoff	  
would	  be	  for	  different	  E’s.	  The	  exchange	  rate	  for	  this	  experiment	  is	  0.05,	  so	  every	  ED	  




	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   Minimum	  Group	  E	  
Your	  E	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
1	   60	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
2	   50	   70	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
3	   40	   60	   80	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
4	   30	   50	   70	   90	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
5	   20	   40	   60	   80	   100	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
6	   10	   30	   50	   70	   90	   110	   -­‐	  





In	  this	  game,	  you	  will	  be	  matched	  anonymously	  with	  a	  partner	  and	  alternate	  in	  
playing	  the	  roles	  of	  Sender	  and	  Receiver.	  Each	  round	  there	  are	  two	  prizes,	  A	  and	  B,	  
π i = 50+ 20*min[e1,e2,e3]−10*ei
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which	  contain	  payoffs	  for	  each	  player.	  The	  Sender	  is	  given	  information	  regarding	  
the	  prizes.	  The	  Sender	  can	  then	  send	  the	  receiver	  one	  of	  two	  messages.	  The	  
messages	  will	  say	  either	  “Prize	  A	  earns	  the	  Sender	  more	  than	  the	  Receiver"	  or	  "Prize	  
B	  earns	  the	  Sender	  more	  than	  the	  Receiver”.	  After	  the	  Sender	  decides	  which	  
message	  to	  send,	  the	  receiver	  decides	  which	  of	  the	  prizes	  to	  choose.	  Hence,	  the	  
Receiver	  determines	  the	  payoffs	  because	  he	  selects	  the	  prize,	  but	  information	  about	  
the	  prizes	  is	  known	  and	  communicated	  by	  the	  Sender.	  Prize	  B	  is	  always	  the	  reverse	  
of	  Prize	  A,	  so	  if	  A	  gives	  the	  Sender	  70,	  B	  will	  give	  the	  Receiver	  70,	  and	  so	  on.	  
	   	  
Let’s	  look	  at	  an	  example.	  Suppose,	  after	  being	  partnered,	  you	  are	  given	  the	  role	  of	  
Sender.	  You	  see	  two	  prizes,	  A	  and	  B.	  Prize	  A	  gives	  the	  Sender	  30	  and	  gives	  the	  
Receiver	  80.	  Prize	  B	  gives	  the	  Sender	  80	  units	  and	  the	  Receiver	  30.	  You	  can	  then	  
send	  the	  Receiver	  one	  of	  two	  messages.	  Message	  1	  says,	  “Prize	  A	  earns	  the	  Sender	  
more	  than	  the	  Receiver.”	  Message	  2	  says,	  “Prize	  B	  earns	  the	  Sender	  more	  than	  the	  
Receiver.”	  Suppose	  you	  decide	  to	  send	  Message	  2.	  Your	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  game	  
is	  now	  finished.	  	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  the	  Receiver,	  this	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  your	  decision-­‐making.	  You	  see	  
Message	  2,	  which,	  if	  you	  recall,	  says,	  “Prize	  B	  earns	  the	  Sender	  more	  than	  the	  
Receiver.”	  It	  is	  now	  up	  to	  you	  to	  choose	  either	  prize	  A	  or	  prize	  B,	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  
you	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  believe	  the	  message.	  After	  you	  make	  your	  decision,	  
the	  payoffs	  are	  revealed	  to	  both	  you	  and	  your	  partner	  and	  the	  game	  ends.	  You	  are	  
then	  matched	  with	  a	  new	  partner	  and	  this	  process	  is	  repeated.	  You	  will	  play	  this	  
game	  a	  total	  of	  16	  times,	  8	  times	  as	  the	  Sender	  and	  8	  times	  as	  the	  Receiver.	  
	  
The	  exchange	  rate	  for	  this	  game	  is	  0.05,	  so	  each	  ED	  is	  worth	  0.05	  real	  dollars.	  If	  you	  
have	  any	  questions,	  you	  may	  ask	  them	  now.	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  Sender	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   Receiver	  
	  
1)	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1)	  Observe	  message	  and	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Key:	  A=Sender,	  B=Receiver	  
	  
2)	  M1:	  Prize	  A	  earns	  the	  Sender	  more	  than	  the	  Receiver	  




A=30,80	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  B=80,30	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Conclusion	  of	  Session	  
	  
The	  lab	  session	  is	  now	  complete.	  You	  may	  communicate	  with	  your	  fellow	  
participants	  as	  you	  please.	  Please	  come	  and	  exchange	  your	  experimental	  dollars	  for	  
real	  dollars	  and	  have	  a	  nice	  day.	  	  As	  a	  final	  request,	  we	  ask	  that	  you	  do	  not	  discuss	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  experiment	  with	  others	  in	  case	  they	  participate	  in	  the	  experiment	  
in	  the	  future.	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